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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Jacqueline Marie Raymond 
 vs.
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3, 
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan
Supreme Court Case No. 46272-2018 
 
CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for the County of Payette












PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Jacqueline Marie Raymond § Location: Payette County District Court 
Nye, Christopher S. 
10/20/2015 
vs. § Judicial Officer: 




















§ Appellate Case Number: 46272-2018 
#Clerk's Record on Appeal 
Posted 









Payette County District Court 
10/28/2015 
Nye, Christopher S. 
PARTY INFORMATION 
Raymond, Jacqueline Marie 
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3 
Payette County 
Sloan, Scott Jacob 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
ffl Complaint Filed 
New Case Filed Other Claims 
New Case Filed - Other Claims 
ROA - Converted Event 
AA- All Initial District Court 
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and Bl) 
Case 08/17/2018 Appealed Case -
Status: Supreme Court Appeal 
Lead Attorneys 
Olsen, Nathan Miles 
Retained 
208-523-4650(W) 
Elia, Michael Joseph 
Retained 
208-336-6900(W) 
Kane, Michael John 
Retained 
208-342-4545(W) 




Filing: Kl - Order granting change of venue (pay to new county). Paid by: Raymond, 
Jacqueline Marie (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0007804 Dated: 10/20/2015 Amount: $.00 
(Cash) For: Raymond, Jacqueline Marie (plaintijj) 
Notice of Appearance 
Plaintiff: Raymond, Jacqueline Marie Appearance Nathan M Olsen 
Notice of Appearance 
Defendant: Payette County Appearance Michael John Kane 
Notice of Appearance 




















PA YEITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Defendant: Sloan, Scott Jacob Appearance Michael John Kane 
Notice of Appearance 
Defendant: Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3 Appearance Michael Joseph Elia 
Order 




Order of Assignment 
Change Assigned Judge 
Change Assigned Judge 
Notice 
Notice of Change of Address 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 12/03/2015 01: 30 PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 12/03/2015 01: 30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled O 1107/2016 01: 30 PM) Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss Defendant Idaho State Police 
CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Vacated 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 
12/03/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Motion 
Motion to Compel Discovery to Idaho State Police 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Objection 
Objection to Defendant Idaho State Police's Rule 12(b)(5) Motion or Alternatively Motion to 
Extend Time For Service 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Defendant Idaho State Police's Rule 12(b)(5) Motion 
or Alternatively Motion to Extend Time For Service 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen 




















PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
Notice 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Notice o/Withdrawal of Motion to Compel 
Notice 
Def Idaho State Police's Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Dismiss 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen 
Reply 
to Plaintiffs Response to Defedants' Motion to Dismiss Regarding Failure to File a Tort Claim I 
Reply 
to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Regarding Failure to Post a Bond 
Response 
in Opposition to Defendants Scott Sloan and Payette County's Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 0 1/0712016 01: 30 PM· Hearing Held 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss 
Court Minutes 
Court Minutes 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leda Waddle 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Hearing Scheduled (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Hearing result for Hearing 
Scheduled scheduled on 01/07/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Theodore Wood in Response to Payette County Reply in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Response 
Payette County's Def Response to the Affidavit of Jason Wood 
'fflAnswer 
Defendant Idaho State Police's Answer to Complaint 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service of Discovery 
Stipulation 
Stipulation for entry of Protective Order 
Order 
Protective Order 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Notice 
Of Compliance 





















PA YE'ITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service of Discovery 
Request 
for Status Conference 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/04/2016 09:00 AM) Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing Held 




DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Status Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Telephonic Status Conference Hearing result/or Status scheduled on 05/04/2016 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service of Discovery 
Motion 
Def s Motion Pursuant to Rule 26 for a Protective Order 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/13/2016 09:30 AM) Motion/or Protective Order 
Stipulation 




Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 05/18/201711:00 AM) JT 7/24/17 





















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/24/2017 09:00 AM) JO days 
Miscellaneous 
Objection to Def Payette County's Motion for Protective Order 
Motion 
to Appear by Telephone 
Motion 
ISP Motion to Appear by Telephone 
Motion 
Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing 
Reply 
to Pl's Objection to Defs Motion/or Protective Order 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 07/13/2016 09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Motion/or 
Protective Order 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Protective Order 08/29/2016 01:30 PM) 
Stipulation 
Stipulated Motion to Vacate Hearing 
Order 
Adopting Stipulated Litigation Plan 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Vacated 






Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result/or Motion For Protective Order scheduled on 08/29/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
CANCELED Motion for Protective Order (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order scheduled on 08/29/2016 OJ: 30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Stipulation 




o/Taking Deposition Duces Tecum ofT Jason Wood 





















Notice of Service 
Motion 
PA YEITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint 
Memorandum 
Defendant Payette County Memorandum in Opposition to Pt's Motion to Amend 
Affidavit 
of Payette County Clerk Julie Anderson 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion I 1/28/2016 01:30 PM) Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint 
~Notice of Hearing 
fflMotion 
Defs Payette County Motion/or Partial Dismissal 
ffl Memorandum 
in Support of Def Payette County's Rule 12 Motion/or Partial Dismissal 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Pl Jacie Raymond 
Notice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Pl Jackie Raymond 
~Motion 
Def JSP's Joinder in Payette County's Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to JRCP 12 (b)(6) I 
Memorandum 
Def JSP's Joinder in Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Pl's Motion to Amend 
Memorandum 
Defendant Idaho State Police's Joinder in Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Reply 
in Support of Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint 
m BriefFiled 
Payette County Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Dismissal 
fflReply 
Def JSP's Reply to Pt's Response in Opposition to Rule 12 Motion for Partial Dismissal 
Motion 
Def Payette County's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Gary Raney in Support of Def Payette County's Motion/or Partial Summary 
Judgment 



















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Def Payette County's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Memorandum 
in Support of Def Payette County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
fflResponse 
in Opposition to Def Payette County's Rule 12 Motion for Partial Dismiss 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 11/28/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Pl's Motion to 
Amend Complaint 
Defs Motion/or Partial Dismissal 
Court Minutes 
Court Minutes 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint 
Defs Motion/or Partial Dismissal Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 11/28/2016 01:30 
PM· Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 02115/2017 01: 30 PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Order 
Approving Stipulation/or protective Order Regarding Confidential Information 
Notice 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Continued 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 02115/2017 OJ: 30 PM: 
Continued 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 03/29/2017 01:30 PM) 
ffl Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Pl's Motion to Amend Complaint and Defs Motion to Dismiss Counts 
II and III 
ffl Partial Judgment Or Opinion Filed 
Of Dismissal of Idaho State Police Only 
Memorandum 
Defendant Idaho State Police's Memorandum of Costs 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael J. Elia in Support of Defendant Idaho State Police's Memorandum of 
Costs 





















PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 02/15/2017 OJ: 30 p M: 
Continued 
Amended Complaint Filed 
Amended Complaint Filed 
Answer 
Def Payette County and Scott Sloan's Answer to Pt's Amended Complaint and Demand/or 
Jury Trial 
Notice of Service 
Stipulation 
Stipulation to Extend Expert Disclosure and Discovery Cutoff Dates 
Order 
Order Allowing Extension of Time for Expert Witness Disclosure and Discovery Cutoff 
Response 
Response in Opposition to Defend Payette County's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen 
Motion 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit o/Gary L. Raney and/or Other Relief 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Gary L. 
Raney 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Strike Affidavit o/Gary L. Raney 3/29/2017 1:30 p.m.) 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 03/29/2017 OJ: 30 PM: 
Hearing Held Motion to Strike Affidavit of Gary L. Raney 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Motion to Strike Affidavit o/Gary L. Raney Hearing result/or Motion/or Partial Summary 
Judgment scheduled on 03/29/2017 OJ: 30 PM: Hearing Held 
Notice of Completion 
Notice Of Compliance 
Notice of Completion 
Notice Of Compliance 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon 
Seclusion Claim 
Memorandum 



















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claim 
Affidavit 
Second Affidavit of Betty Dressen in Support of Def Payette County Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Def Payette County Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claim 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Charles Huff in Support of Def Payette County Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claim 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 05/22/2017 01:30 PM) 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Defs Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion in limine 
Concerning PJ's Expert Witness Carolyn Barnhart 
Motion 
Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Concerning Pt's Expert Witness Carolyn Barnhart 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice of Completion 
Notice Of Compliance 
Motion 
Defendant Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Scott Sloan in Support of Defendant Payette County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Gary Raney in Support of Defendant Payette County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice OfHearing-5/22/2017 l:30p.m. 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion in Limine Concerning Pt's Claimed Damages 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County's Motion in Limine Concerning PJ's Claimed 
Damages 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 





















Notice of Hearing 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Kenn Meneely 
Motion 
PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Motion In Limine Re Alcohol Consumption of Decedent Barry Johnson 
Notice 
Notice of Deposition Duces Te cum of Lt Andy Creech 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Payette County Sheriff Charles Huff 
Memorandum 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Payette County's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Denying Pl's Motion to Strike Gary Raney's Affidavit 
Motion 
Plaintiff's 56(d) Motion for Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of Summary Judgment I 
Hearing 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of Plaintiff's 56(d) Motion for Continuance to Allow 
Discovery in Advance of Summary Judgment Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/18/2017 11:00 AM) for Continuance to Allow Discovery in 
Advance of Summary Judgment Hearing 
Memorandum 
Defendant Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine: RE 
Alcohol Consumption of Decendent 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of Response in Opposition to Def Payette County's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Response 
Response in Opposition to Def Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice 
Notice of Non-opposition to Pl's 56(d) Motion for Continuance to Allow Discovery 
Miscellaneous 
Defendant Payette County's Compliance with Pretrial Order 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Jackie Raymond 
Response 
Response in Opposition to Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re Barnhart and Claimed 
Damages 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Stipulation 
Stipulation to Continue Pretrial Conference 


















PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Continued 
Continued (Pretrial Conference 05122/20 I 7 0 I: 30 PM) JT 7124/ J 7 
Miscellaneous 
Defendant Payette County's Compliance with Pretrial Order 
Miscellaneous 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Stipulation 
Stipulation Pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Pretrial Coriference 
Continued 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/18/2017 I I :00 AM· Continued/or Continuance to 
Allow Discovery in Advance of Summary Judgment Hearing 
Notice of Completion 
Notice Of Compliance 
Miscellaneous 
Payette County's Reply in Support of Motions in Limine Re: Carolyn Barnhart and Claimed 
Damages 
Miscellaneous 
Reply in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Alcohol Consumption of Decedent Barry Johnson 
Motion Hearing ( 11 :00 AM) ( Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
for Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of Summary Judgment Hearing Hearing result I 
for Motion scheduled on 05118/2017 I 1:00 AM· Continued 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/22/2017 0 I: 30 PM· 
Hearing Held Defs Motion to Strike/Motn In Limine Re: Pt's &pert Witness/Def s Motn in 
Limine/Pl's Motion in Limine/Motion for Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of 
Summary Judgment Hearing 
Hearing Held 




DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 06/20/2017 10:30 AM) Hearing to 
be held in Canyon County 
Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
JT 7124117 Hearing result/or Pretrial Conference scheduled on 05/22/2017 01:30 PM: 
Hearing Held 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Defs Motion to Strike/Motn In Limine Re: Pt's &pert Witness/Defs Motn in Limine/Pl's 
Motion in Limine/Motionfor Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of Summary 
Judgment Hearing Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 
05/22/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 




















Notice of Service 
Notice Oj"Service 
Notice of Service 
Notice Oj"Service 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Memorandum 
PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions Heard May 22, 2107 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Supplemental Evidence for Defs Motion in Limine 
Regarding Damages 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Defs Motion In Limine Regarding Evidentiary Matters I 
and Motion for Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County Motion for Entry of Court Order Governing 
Trial Proceedings 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County Motion In Limine Concerning Pretrial 
Evidentiary Matters 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion for Entry of Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion in Limine Concerning Pretrial Evidentiary Matters and Standard 
to Declare Mistrial 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Response 
Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Claim 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Claim 
Motion 
Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure Deadlines 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan olsen in support of Motion to Vacate Trial Setting 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Oj"Hearing-6/20/2017 10:30 Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure 
Deadlines 
Memorandum 
Defendant Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Trial 




















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
and Extend Disclosure Deadlines 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend 
Disclosure/ Deadlines 
Motion 
Motion to Intervene Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 24(A)(I) for Purpose of Asserting Rights and 
Privileges on Behalf of &ott Sloan Assertion of Privilege and Request for Award of Attorney 
Fees Againse Plaintiff's Counsel 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene Pursuant to I.RC.P. 24(A)(J) for Purpose of 
Asserting Rights and Privileges on Behalf of &ott Sloan, Assertion of Privilege, and Request 
for Award of Attorney Fees Against Plaintiffs Counsel 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing- Motion to Intervene-June 20, 2017 at 10:30 a.m. 
Motion 
Motion for Exparte Order Shortening Time for Notice of Hearing 
Motion 
Motion for Exparte Order Shortening Time for Notice of Hearing 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion for Award of Attny Fees 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County Motion for Award of Attorney Fees 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Motion for Pretective Order 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion for Protective Order 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County Motion for for Protective Order 
Miscellaneous 
Reply Brief in Support of Payette County Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Intrusion 
Notice 
of Hearing 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order 
Reply 
to Pt's Response to Payette County's Various Motion Set for Hearing 
Motion 
Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re: Pt's Disclosed Experts 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Pl's Disclosed Experts 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Def Payette County Motion In Limine Re Pt's 
Disclosed Experts 





















PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Affidavit I 
Second Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Def s Motion in Limine Re Evidentiary Matters I 
Miscellaneous 
Written Response to Payette County's Various Motions 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Jackie Raymond 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of the Written Response to Payette Countyls Various 
Motions 
Continued 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/24/2017 09:00 AM: Continued 1 O days 
Court Minutes 
Court Minutes 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Hearing to be held in Canyon County 
Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure and Discovery Deadlines Hearing result 
for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 06/20/2017 10:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 06/20/2017 I 0: 30 AM: 
Hearing Held Hearing to be held in Canyon County 
Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure and Discovery Deadlines 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 07/24/2017 01:30 PM) Re: Pt's Disclosed Experts 
Notice of Service 
Notice of Service 
Notice of Hearing 
Request 
for Clarification and Motion to Bifurcate Trial 
Request 
for Scheduling Conference 
Notice of Hearing 
Affidavit 
of Nathan Olsen In Support of Memo in Opposition to Payette County's Motion in Limine Re 
Pt's Disclosed Experts 
Memorandum 
in Opposition to Payette County's Motion in Limine Re Pt's Disclosed Experts 
Reply 
to Pt's Response to Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re Pt's Disclosed Experts 
























PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 07/24/2017 OJ: 30 PM: Hearing Held Re: 
Pt's Disclosed Experts and Scheduling Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/23/2018 09:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 03/15/2018 09:00 AM) to be held Canyon County 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
07 /24/2017-08/04/2017 
JO days Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/24/2017 09:00 AM: Continued 
Motion in Limine (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Re: Pt's Disclosed Experts and Scheduling Hearing Hearing result for Motion in Limine 
scheduled on 07/24/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Court Minutes 
Motion 
Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant JRCP 12(b)(6) 
Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Def Payette County's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to JRCP I 2(b) 
(6) 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/28/2017 08:30 AM) to be held in Canyon County 
Memorandum 
in Support of Def Payette County's Motion In Limine Re Post Occurrence Remedial Measures 
Motion 
of Def Payette County's Motion In Limine Re Post Occu"ence Remedial Measures 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing 
Order 
Protective Order Concerning Scott Sloan's Personal Medical Records and lriformation 
Notice of Completion 
Notice Of Compliance 




















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
Continued 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Continued (Motion 0911112017 03:00 PM) to be held in Payette County 
Order 
Order to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing 
Stipulation 
Stipulation to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing 
Memorandum 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Payette County's Motion in Limine 
Notice 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Notice 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Notice 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Response 
Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's "Motion in Limine Regarding Post 
Occurrence Remedial Measures" 
Response 
Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's "Response for Clarification and Motion I 
to Bifurcate Trial" 
Objection 
Objection to Defendant's "Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)" 
Miscellaneous 
Reply Brief in Support of Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re: Post Occurrence Remedial 
Measures 
Miscellaneous 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6) 
Miscellaneous 
Reply Brief in Support of Request for Clarification and Motion to Bifurcate Trial 
Hearing Held 




DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tammy Webber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
to be held in Payette County Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 0911112017 03:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 
Miscellaneous 
Objection to Def s Proposed Orders 






















PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Order Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial 
ROA - Converted Event 
Request for Trial Setting 
fflorder 
on Defs IRCP 12(b)(6) Motion/or Partial Dismissal and Motion in Limine Re: Subsequent 
Remedial Measures 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Brandon Eller 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Jacqueline Lisle 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Dale Lisle 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Rosemary Melcher 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Fred Rice 
Notice 
Notice of Taking Deposition ofTerry Murdock 
Affidavit of Service 
Affidavit Of Service 
fflNotice 
of Taking Deposition of Carolyn Barnhart 
ffl Acknowledgment 
of Service of Subpoena and Notice of Deposition 
fflNotice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Fred Rice 
ffl Memorandum 
Decision on Defs Request for Clarification 
~ Affidavit of Service 
ffl Notice of Service 
ffl Affidavit of Service 
~Notice 
Of Compliance 



















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Amended Notice a/Taking Deposition a/Carolyn Barnhart 
ffl Notice of Service 
fflNotice 
Second Amended Notice a/Taking Deposition of Fred Rice 
fflPetition 
Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena for Records and Motion for Protective Order 
ffl Memorandum 
in Support of Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records and 
Motion for Protective Order 
ffl Affidavit 
of Counsel in Support of Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective 
Order 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/03/2018 09:00 AM) to be held in Canyon County 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
of Hearing on Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena for Records and Motion for 
Protective Order. 
fflNotice of Hearing 
fflMotion 
Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena for Records; Motion/or Protective Order as it 
Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for Attorney Fees 
~ Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena for Records; Motion for Protective 
Order as it Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for Attorney Fees 
fflAffidavit 
of Michael Kane in Support of Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena for Records; 









for Change of Venue 
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CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
of Jackie Raymond in Support of Motion for Change of Venue 
fflNotice of Hearing 
~ Memorandum 
Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Change of Venue 
mAffidavit 
of Michael Kane in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Change of Venue 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/18/201811:00 AM) to be held in Canyon County 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
Amended Notice Of Hearing on Just Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena/or Records and 
Motion/or Protective Order 
~Notice of Hearing 
Amended 
~ Notice of Hearing 
Amended 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/03/2018 09:00AM: Hearing Held to be held in 
Canyon County 
Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/03/2018 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/31/2018 01:30 PM) to be held in Canyon County 
ffl Affidavit 
of Michael Kane Support of Payette County's Motion for Discovery Sanctions for Failure to 
Disclose 
fflMotion 
Payette County's Motion for Discovery Sanctions for Failure to Disclose 
ffl Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County's Motion/or Discovery Sanctions/or Failure to Disclose 
fflNotice of Hearing 
ffl Affidavit 
of Michael Kane Support of Payette County's Motion to Allow Use of Video Deposition 
ffl Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County's Motion to Allow Use of Video Deposition 
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CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Payette County's Motion to A/law Use of Video Deposition Motion 
fflNotice of Hearing 
~ Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County's Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Re: Non-retained &pert 
~Motion 
Payette County's Motion Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Re: Non-retained &pert 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
mAffidavit 
of Michael Kane in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 Calls 
'3 Affidavit 
of Linda Hoxie in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 Calls 
ffl Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 Calls 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
~Affidavit 
of Michael Kane in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: &cerpts 
of Carmack Report 
~ Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: &cerpts of Carmack 
Report 
mMotion 
Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: &cerpts of Carmack Report 
mNotice of Hearing 
ffl Affidavit 
of Michael Kane in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: Non-
Retained ISP &pert Witnesses 
m Memorandum 
in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: Non-Retained ISP &pert 
Witnesses 
fflMotion 
Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: Non-Retained ISP &pert Witnesses 
mNotice 
of Hearing 
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CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
to Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena/or Records; Motion/or Protectiver Order; 
and Request/or Attorney Fees 
fflobjection 
to Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena/or Records 
fflAffidavit 
of Nathan Olsen 
~Reply 
In Support of Motion for Change of Venue 
fflReply 
to Plaintiff's Response to Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena/or Records; Motion/or 
Protective Order as it Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for Attorney 
Fees 
m BriefFiled 
Reply Brief in Support of Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena/or Records and Motion 
for Protective Order 
ffl Affidavit 
of Melissa Stroh in Support of Defs Motion in Limine Regarding 911 Dispatchers Calls after 
Notification 
fflMotion 
Defs Motion in Limine Regarding 911 Dispatchers Calls after Notification 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/18/201811:00 AM: Hearing Held to be held in 
Canyon County 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Motion Hearing (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/18/2018 11:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
ffl Court Minutes 
fflNotice 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/09/2018 01:30 PM) to be held in Canyon County 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Held to be held in 
Canyon County 
Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 01:30 PM: 

















PA YEITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Hearing Held 
m Declaration 
of Jackie Raymond 
mAffidavit 
of Nathan Olsen In Support Motions heard on 2/9/18 
mResponse 
in Opposition to Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion In Limine Re: Pl Expert Witness 
Carlie Corbin 
ffl Response 
in Opposition to Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Excerpts of Carmack's 
Accident Report 
fflResponse 
in Opposition to Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Re: Pl's Non-Retained ISP 
Expert Witnesses 
ffl Response 
in Opposition to Payette County's Motion in Llmine Re: 911 Dispatchers Calls After 
Notification 
~Objection 
to Payette County Motion for Discovery Sanctions for Failure to Disclose 
~Reply 
to Pl's Opposition to Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 calls 
fflReply 
to Pl's Opposition to Def Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Carmack's 
Accident 
fflReply 
to Pl's Opposition to Def Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine ISP Expert 
fflReply 
to Pl's Opposition to Payette County Motion for Discovery Sanctions 
fflReply 
to Pl's Opposition to Def Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine 
fflNotice 
of No Opposition to Payette County Motion to Allw Use of Video Deposition 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/09/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Held to be held in 
Canyon County 
Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/0912018 01: 30 PM: 
Hearing Held 




















PA YE'ITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
~ Court Minutes 
~Order 
Granting Def s Motion to Quash Subpoena and Denying Pt's Motion for Change of Venue 
fflNotice 








Re Defendant Payette County's Motions Heard February 9, 2018 
ffl Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Julie Bonsall 
~ Notice of Taking Deposition 
of DP Van Blaricom 
'§Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Billy Brummett 
~ Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Rob Raynor 
~ Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Colleen Rheault 
ffl Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Gary Clark 
m Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Anthony Johnson 
fflNotice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum 
of Carol Jacques 
ffl Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum 
of Brian Pearce 
ffl0rder 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Exclude the 911 Dispatch Tapes 
ffl Affidavit of Service 



















PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Affidavit Of Service (6) 
~Notice 
of Taking Deposition of Paul Duplissie 
~Notice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of DP Van Blaricom 
~Notice 
Def Payette County's Compliance with Pretrial Order 
mNotice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Gary Clark 
~Notice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Colleen Rheault 
~Notice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Rob Raynor 
~Notice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Paul Duplissie 
fflNotice 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Carol Jacques 
mNotice 
Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of DP Van Blaricom 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leda Waddle 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 03/15/2018 09:00 AM: Hearing Held to 
be held Canyon County 
Pre-trial Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
to be held Canyon County Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 03/15/2018 
09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
ffl Stipulation 
Pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Pretrial Conference 
ffl Court Minutes 
~Notice 
of Taking Deposition of Scott Sloan 
fflNotice of Hearing 
Entry of Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings 


















PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
fflResponse 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion In Limine 
ffl Memorandum 
in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Entry of Court Order Governing Trial 
Proceedings 
fflMotion 
Defendant's Second Motion/or Entry o/Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings 
~Notice of Hearing 
Motion in Limine 
fflMotion 
in Limine 
ffl Notice of Service 
mAffidavit 
Defendant's Addendum to Second Motion for Entry o/Court Order 
~ Affidavit 
of Britainy Kingsmore 
~Motion 
to A/law Use of Sloan's Depo and Rebut Witns by Phone 
ffl Affidavit 
of Nathan Olsen in Supp. of Motion to A/law Use 
mReply 
in Support of Motion in Limine 
'mMotion 
Renewed Motion for Change of Venue 
ffi Memorandum 
Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum 
ffl Memorandum 
Memorandum in Opposition Re Use of Deposition of Scott Sloan 
ffl Brief Filed 
Defendant Payette County's Trial Brief 
ffl Notice of Service 
Notice of Service 
Motion Hearing (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Defendant's Motion for Entry o/Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings and Motion in 
Limine 





















Iii Court Minutes 
PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
Motion Hearing 4116/18 held in Canyon County 
ffl Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Jury Instructions 
~Notice 
Defendant Payette County's Opening Presentation Exhibits 
fflMotion 
to Strike Certain Jurors for Cause 
gJ Affidavit 
of Nathan Olsen (MT Strike Jurors) Parts 1 - 2 
fflMotion 
to Exclude Cert. Trial Exhibits of Def 
fil Affidavit 
of Nathan Olsen (Exel. Exhs. of Def) Parts 1 - 4 
Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
04/23/2018-04/25/2018 
JO days 
'3 Transcript Filed 
Motion Hearing 4/16/18 
ffl Court Minutes 
ffl Preliminary Jury Instructions 
~ Court Minutes 
CANCELED Scheduling Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Vacated 
Telephonic 
QJ Telephone Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
'3Notice of Trial Setting, Pre-Trial Conf, Order 
ffl Court Minutes 
~ Notice of Service of Discovery Requests 
Notice a/Service (14th Suppl. Response) 
ffl Stipulation to Dismiss 
with Prejudice 
fflorder 
















PAYETI'E COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2015-954 
of Dismissal with Prejudice 
.Judgment 
Final 
Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Comment() 
Party (Sloan, Scott Jacob; Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3; Raymond, Jacqueline Marie; 
Payette County) 
Monetary/Property Award 
In Favor Of: Sloan. Scott Jacob; Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3; Raymond, 
Jacqueline Marie; Payette County; Kane, Michael John; Elia, Michael Joseph; 
Olsen, Nathan Miles 
Against: Sloan, Scott Jacob; Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3; Raymond, 
Jacqueline Marie; Payette County; Kane, Michael John; Elia, Michael Joseph; 
Olsen, Nathan Miles 
Entered Date: 07/11/2018 
Current Judgment Status: 
Status: Dismissal of Judgment By Court Order 
Status Date: 07/11/2018 
Civil Disposition Entered 
• Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
• Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
.Request 
Respondent's Request/or Additional Transcript and Clerk's Record 
Case Summary 
• Exhibit List/Log 
Certificate of Exhibit 
• Clerk's Certificate of Service 
• Appeal Cover/fitle Page 
CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Vacated 
Telephonic 
CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.) 
Vacated 
i<'INANCIAL INFORMATION 
Plaintiff Raymond, Jacqueline Marie 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 9/20/2018 
Attorney of Record Olsen, Nathan Miles 
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Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
E-mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO,----~:-----FILEO ~~----..1.P.M, ___ _ 
FEB 2 7 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an 
heir, and as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of BARRY JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and 
SCOTT SLOAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2015~v O C 15 0 3 2 3 9 
COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A.A. 
Fee: $221.00 
As and for cause of action against the above-named defendants, Plaintiff Jackie 
Raymond alleges and prays as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Jackie Raymond is an individual residing in the City of Nampa, Canyon 
County, Idaho, and is the sole surviving offspring of Barry Johnson, deceased. 
1 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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2. Plaintiff is an "heir" of Mr. Johnson ·within the meaning ofldaho Code § 5-311 
and is the personal representative of the Estate of Barry Johnson. 
3. Defendant Payette County is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho within 
the meaning of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code §6-901, et seq. 
4. Defendant Scott Sloan was, at all times material hereto, acting in his individual 
capacity and within the course and scope of his duties as an employee and Deputy Sheriff for 
Payette County. Sloan's negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and wantonness as 
alleged herein are therefore imputed to Payette County pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat 
superior and Idaho Code § 6-903 . 
. 5. Defendant Idaho State Police ("ISP") is a department and/or agency of the State of 
Idaho within the meaning of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code §6-901, et seq. 
6. At all times material hereto, ISP acted through its employees and agents, who 
were acting at all times material hereto within the course and scope of their employment and 
agency with ISP, thereby subjecting ISP to liability for their tortious conduct pursuant to Idaho 
agency law and the doctrine of respondeat superior and Idaho Code § 6-903. 
7. The defendants have been properly and timely served with a tort claim notice 
in accordance with Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code, which claim has been denied. 
8. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705. 
9. The amount in controversy exceeds this Court's jurisdictional threshold. 
10. Venue is proper in Ada County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-915, 5-402 
and/or § 5-404. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. On or about October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson was operating his 1983 Jeep CJ7 
on Idaho State Highway 30 in an easterly direction, when he made a lawful turn into the 
driveway of his residence just outside New Plymouth, Idaho. 
12. As Mr. Johnson was making his lawful left turn into his driveway, Defendant 
Scott Sloan was attempting to pass Mr. Johnson on the left, at speeds as high as 115 mph 
according to initial ISP investigation, a speed Sloan knew to be far too great for any evasive 
maneuvers in the likely event he would need to avoid lawful action by other motorists like Mr. 
Johnson. 
13. Sloan was personally aware that driveways from private residences and farms 
lined Highway 30, and that pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists often entered and exited 
Highway 30 from their residences or farms. 
14. By driving at such a speed grossly in excess of the posted speed limit and in 
such a populated area with visible traffic, Sloan endangered life and property, drove without 
due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, and recklessly disregarded the 
safety of others using highway, in violation of Idaho law and certain Idaho State statutes, 
including but not limited to Idaho Code§§ 49-654, 49-623, and 49-625, thereby rendering 
Sloan negligent per se. 
15. As a direct and proximate result of Sloan's misconduct, his patrol car collided 
with Mr. Johnson's Jeep in an extremely violent manner and at an extreme rate of speed, 
ejecting Mr. Johnson as well as the engine and drive train from the Jeep, killing Mr. Johnson. 
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16. Based upon information and belief, Payette County was aware of Sloan's 
propensity to speed, drive recklessly, and flout the very laws he enforced, yet failed to take 
reasonable measures to reign hini in, and failed to develop rules and to properly train, 
supervise, and control its Deputies, including Sloan, in the safe operation of patrol cars when 
responding to a code call or pursuing a suspect, which was a substantial factor causing 
damages to Plaintiff. 
17 During ISP's investigation of the misconduct of defendant Sloan as alleged, and 
prosecution of Sloan therefor, the defendants conspired and attempted to, and did, cover up 
Sloan's misconduct and/or unduly influence the investigation, evidence, and witnesses 
accordingly, in order to shield defendants Sloan and Payette County from liability and 
responsibility for Sloan's aforesaid misconduct. 
18. The defendants engaged in an enterprise or conspiracy with Sloan to, and did in 
fact, willfully and with full knowledge of Sloan's unlawful conduct, conceal evidence, harbor 
and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and intimidate, influence, impede, deter, 
threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or potential witnesses, all in violation of state and 
federal law but in favor of a corrupt policy and effort to protect fellow Idaho law enforcement 
officers from the consequences of their unlawful conduct. 
19. The defendants also thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff's claim and increased 
the cost in pursuing the claim. Specifically, felony criminal charges were initially filed against 
Sloan for the vehicular manslaughter of Barry Johnson, in Idaho District Court in Payette 
County, Criminal Case No. 2012-566. After a preliminary hearing on April 13, 2012, before 
the Magistrate Judge, the Court found probable cause to bind Sloan over to District Court to 
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answer the felony vehicular manslaughter charges. The matter was ultimately set for April 22, 
2013. However, the defendants conspired to, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence, 
intimidate witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby causing the 
prosecutor to dismiss the charges. But for the defendants' cover-up and interference as alleged 
herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan would have been convicted. Such 
conviction would have rendered liability in this matter res judicata. The absence of such a 
conviction exponentially increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintiffs civil case, and 
because of the defendants' evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove Hability, 
making Plaintiff's civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have been. 
COUNT I - WRONGFUL DEATH 
20. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 19 above as if fully restated 
herein. 
21. Sloan's misconduct as alleged constitutes negligence, gross negligence, 
recklessness, and wanton misconduct, and exhibits an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct. 
22. As a direct and proximate result of Sloan's misconduct as alleged above, both 
individually and in his capacity as agent for Payette County, Jackie Raymond has lost the 
support, care, love, comfort, society, and companionship of her beloved father, and caused the 
Estate of Barry Johnson to incur special damages including, but not limited to, post-mortem 
medical and transportation expenses, and funeral costs and expenses. 
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COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ACTION 
23. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 22 above as if fully restated 
herein. 
24. The defendants were negligent per se, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and Idaho Code 
§§ 18-2604 & 2605, in directly or indirectly intimidating, harassing, corruptly persuading or 
engaging in misleading conduct toward, witnesses or potential witnesses in order to influence or 
cause to the withholding of their testimony or potential testimony. 
25. The defendants' wrongful interference was wrongful beyond the fact of the 
interference itself, inter alia, because violated the aforesaid Idaho statutes. 
26. The defendants knew litigation was likely to occur as a result of Sloan's 
misconduct as alleged above, and willfully destroyed or concealed evidence in an effort to 
disrupt Plaintiff's case, thereby disrupting Plaintiff's case as alleged above. 
27. Such conduct resulted in disruption of Plaintiff's case, and damages to Plaintiff, 
including but not limited to a massive increase in the costs of pursuing liability of the wrongful 
death claims, a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing interest from the significant 
delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages including severe emotional distress and 
humiliation suffered by Plaintiff. 
COUNT III - (IN THE ALTER.J.~ATIVE) 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE ·wITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
28. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 27 above as if fully restated 
herein. 
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29 Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy known to the defendants in the form 
of Plaintiff's claims and causes of action against Sloan and Payette County arising from the 
death of Mr. Johnson. 
30. The defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's valid economic 
expectancy, resulting in the reduction, destruction, or disruption thereof. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' misconduct alleged above, 
Plaintiff's ability to obtain legal redress for their ittjuries has been significantly impaired. 
INTEREST AND ATTORNEY FEES 
32. Portions of plaintiffs damages are liquidated as to the amount, and Plaintiff is 
entitled to pre and post judgment interest on such damages at the maximum rate allowed by law 
and applicable statute. 
3 3. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her reasonable attorney fees sand pursuant to 
applicable Idaho statutes and court rules, including Idaho Code § 12-117. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
34. Plaintiff reserves all right of and hereby provides notice of her intent to amend her 
Complaint for a claim of punitive damages against all named defendants. 
WHEREFORE,· Plaintiff prays Judgment of the Court as follows: 
1. For a declaration that defendants' misconduct was in violation of plaintiff's 
legal rights; 
2. For an award of general and special damages suffered by Plaintiff as alleged 
above and according to proof at trial; 
4. For prejudgment interest on plaintiff's damages as provided by law; 
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5. For attorney fees as provided by statute and court Rule; 
6. For the cost of suit incurred herein; and 
7. For such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands trial by jury, comprised of the maximum number of jurors allowed 
by applicable law, as to all issues triable to a jury in this action. 
l'J J ~iii.-
DATED _~_clay of February, 2015. 
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FILED Michael J. Elia (ISBN 5044) 
Brady J. Hall (ISBN 7873) 
MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
PAYETTE COUNTY. IDAHO 
Post Office Box 6756 
FEB O 4 2016 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336~6900 
Facsimile: (208) 336-7031 
DRESSEN,CLERK 
"""~.;.._ __ __..,1EPUTY 
Arror-,,eys for Defendant Idaho State Police 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir. 




IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT 
SLOAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV•2015-00954-C 
DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE 
POLICE'S ANSWER TO 
COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the Defendant Idaho State Police, by and through its attorneys of record, 
Moore & Elia, LLP, and in response to Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
(hereinafter "Plaintiff's Corn.plaint"), hereby admits, denies, and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim or claims against this Defendant upon which 
relief can be granted. 
DEFENDANT lDAHO STATE POLICE'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- p. 1 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant denies all allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint that are not specifical]y admitted 
herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
1. This Defendant lacks know]edge or information sufficient to fonn a belief as to 
the truth of the aJJegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of P]aintiff's Complaint, and 
therefore denies them at this time pursuant to Rule 8(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint are 
directed to parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent 
a response is required of this Defendant those allegations are denied for lack of knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein. 
3. This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph S of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
4. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
Plaintifrs Colnplaint. 
5. This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
6. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. This Defendant admits only that the accident that is the subject of the 
complaint occurred on October 18,2011 on Highway 30 near New PJymouth, Idaho. 
7. The allegations contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Plaintiff's Complaint are 
directed to parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent 
DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE POLICE'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- p. 2 
FEB-04-2016 14:02 From: ID:N+T PMH+o Page:003 R:95% 
Page 39
1 ~ V, 't, L V I V L , IL I "I NO.V/IL r. 'I/IV 
a response is required of this Defendant those allegations are denied for lack of knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein. 
8. This Defendant admits that only Mr. Johnson was kiJled in the accident. 
Defendant denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
9. The allegations contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint are directed to 
parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response 
is required of this Defendant those allegations are denied for lack of knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein. 
10. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of 
P laintur s Complaint. 
11. As to the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this 
Defendant realleges its responses to paragraphs 1-19 and incorporates the same by reference as 
applicable. 
12. The allegations contained in paragraph 21 and 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint are 
directed to parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent 
a response is required of this Defendant those allegations arc denied for lack of knowledge or 
information sufficient to fonn a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein. 
13, As to the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this 
Defendant realleges its responses to Paragraphs 1-22 and incorporates the same by reference as 
applicable. 
14, This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 24, 25, 26 and 27 
of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE POLICE'S ANSWER TO COMFLAINT- p. 3 
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15. As to the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this 
Defendant realleges its responses to paragraphs 1-27 and incorporates the SalD.e by reference as 
applicable. 
16. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 of 
Plaintifrs Complaint. 
17. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 of 
Plaintiff's Coinplaint. 
Ali'FIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
At the time of the filing of this Answer, this Defendant has not been able to engage in 
discovery and lacks information sufficient to form a belief as to all affinnative defenses that 
might apply in this matter. At this time, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Defendant is asserting the following affinnative defenses so that the same are not 
waived. If factual information is not developed sufficient to support any specific affirmative 
defense, the affirmative defense in question will be withdrawn. 
The foregoing defenses arc applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of Plaintiff's 
claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, this Defendant docs not admit that it has a burden 
of proving the allegations or denials cont.ained in the defenses, but, to the contrary, asserts that 
by reason of the denials and/or by reasons of relevant statutory and judicial authority, the burden 
of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses, and/or burden of proving the inverse to the 
allegations contained in many of the defenses, is upon the Plaintiff. In asserting any defense, this 
Defendant does not admit any responsibility or liability, but, to the contrary, specifically denies 
any and all allegations, responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
This Defendant breached no duty to Plaintiff's Decedent or Plaintiff. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Without admitting any of Plaintiff's allegations of responsibility, which obligations this 
Defendant specifically denies, this Defendant asserts that any conduct on the part of this 
Defendant or its employees was not a legal, actual or proximate cause of the subject accident or 
injuries alleged. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Without admitting any responsibility on the pan of this Defendant, which this Defendant 
specifically denies, this Defendant asserts the comparative negligence doctrine fmmd in Idaho 
Code §6-801, et seq., as a complete or partial bar to Plaintiff's case. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Without admitting any responsibility on the part of this Defendant, which this Defendant 
specifically denies, this Defendant assem that the accident described in Plaintiff's Complaint 
was caused by the acts or omissions of other persons or entities for whom this Defendant is not 
responsible. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest for all or a portion of their damages. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
This Defendant asserts the colla1eral source doctrine found in Idaho Code §6-1606. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any. 
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The accident described in Plaintiff's Complaint was caused by or was the proxitnatc 
result of intervening, ~perseding causes, over which this Defendant had no control, thus baning 
Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant Idaho State Police are barred by the public duty 
doctrine. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the faHure to file, untimely filing, or insufficient 
setvice of their tort claim, Idaho Code §6-906, et seq. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The damages sustained by Plaintiff, if any there were, were directly and proximately 
caused by the acts and omissions of Plaintiff, the Decedent, or third parties not under the Idaho 
State Police's control. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Idaho State Police Defendant is immune from liability under state law for claims 
based upon negligent investigation. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The damages sustained by Plaintiff, if any there were, were directly and proximately 
caused by the acts and/or omissions of Plaintiff and/or the Decedent. 
FOURTEENTH All'FIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
In regard to Plaintiff's state law claim, punitive damages are not available under the 
Idaho Ton Claims Act. 
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ll'IFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Idaho State Police Defendant did not have knowledge of any economic expectancy 
with respect to Plaintiff, nor did Defendant wrongfully or intentionaJly interference with any 
such economic expectancy. 
SIXTEENTH AFFJRMATIVE DEFENSE 
There is no state law claim for tortious interference with prospective action. 
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the two year statute of hmitations of Idaho Code §5-219. 
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
This Defendant has considered and believes that it may have additional further defenses 
to Plaintiff's Complaint, but cannot st.ate with specificity those defenses at this time, consistent 
with Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, this Defendant reseJVes the 
right to supplement its Answer and to add additional affirmative defenses. or to file and serve 
other reSponsive pleadings, allegations, or claims. 
REQUEST FOR ATI'ORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Defendant has been required to obtain the services of the law firm of Moore & Elia, LLP, 
to defend it against this action and the allegations contained in Plainti~s Complaint, and are 
entitled by law to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the defense of this 
matter. This Defendant alleges and hereby makes claim against Plaintiff for full recovery of its 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending this action, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§12-121, 6-918A, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and all other applicable 
laws allowing for recovery of costs or attorneys' fees by this Defendant in defending this action. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, this Defendant prays for judgment against Plaintiff dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint against this Defendant with prejudice and granting Plaintiff none of the 
relief prayed for therein; granting this Defendant its attorney's fees and costs; and granting this 
Defendant such other and fmther relief as this Court deems just. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
This Defendant requests that this matter be tried to a jury pursi1ant to Rule 38 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this Lf~ay of February, 2016. 
MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
By_---3---=;:...-!--1-------=IL----1...---
Michacl J. Elia, A 
Idaho State Police 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 this l/12day of February, 2016, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen 
485 ''E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane Associates 
4355 West Emerald Strecti Suite 190 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701-2865 
A"orneys for Defendants Payetre County and 
ScortS/oan 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
1Facsimile Transmission 208-524-3391 
__ E-Mail: golsen@pmholaw.com 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
iA(Facsiinile Transmission 208-342-2323 
__ E•Mail: mkane@lctlaw.net 
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MICHAEL J. KANE 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190 
Post Office Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865 
Telephone: (208) 342-4545 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323 
Idaho State Bar No. 2652 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PA YETIE 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, ) 
and as Personal Representative of the EST A TE ) 
OF BARRY JOHNSON, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IDAHO ST A TE POLICE, an Idaho State 
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PARTIES, BY AND THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant PAYETTE COUNTY will call up its Motion/or 
Partial Dismissal Pursuant to J.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for hearing and argument before the above-
entitled Court, in the Courtroom thereof, located at 1130 3rd Avenue North, in the City of Payette, 
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County of Payette, State of Idaho, on the 2s•1a day of November, 2016, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. 
before the Honorable Christopher S. Nye, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 2016. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BY: --;~-~~ .. 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorneys for Payette County Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of October, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 4'E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
[Facsimile: #(208) 524-3391] 
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com] 
Counsel for ISP 
Michael J. Elia 
Moore & Elia, LLP 
P. 0. Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83 707 
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031] 
[Email: mje@melawfirm.net] 
Courtesy Copy To: 
Sheri McCain 
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye 
Canyon Cowity Court 
[Email: secsm@canyonco.org] 
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS PAYETTE COUNTY AND SCOTT SLOAN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, ) 
and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE ) 
OF BARRY JOHNSON, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
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Case No. CV-2015-00954-C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT PAYETTE 
COUNTY'S RULE 12 MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL DISMISS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, PAYETTE COUNTY, by and through its attorney of 
record, Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and hereby provides this 
Court the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In addition to a wrongful death claim, Plaintiff seeks to hold Payette County liable for 
tortious interference with a prospective cause of action and intentional interference with a 
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prospective economic advantage, by claiming Payette County violated certain criminal statutes 
and that Plaintiff lost the opportunity to exploit a negligence per se theory as part of her 
wrongful death claim. Plaintiff's tortious interference claims rest on proving that "but for" 
supposed but unstated actions undertaken by Payette County, Sheriff's Deputy Scott Sloan 
("Deputy Sloan") would have been convicted of a criminal charge, which would have benefited 
Plaintiff in a civil action. Boiled down to their essence, Plaintiff's claims amount to demanding 
money because she has to prove her wrongful death claim as every other tort claimant must - by 
presenting evidence and proving damages. "If only" Deputy Sloan was convicted of vehicular 
manslaughter, she would not have to prove liability. Because she has to prove liability, we are 
told, she has been damaged. 
Plaintiff's Counts II and Ill are stated in the alternative, and are something of a mash up, 
blending negligence and intentional tort theories, and setting forth torts not adopted in Idaho. 
Plaintiff's theories are based on several faulty underpinnings, and as a matter of law, fail to state 
proper claims and therefore must be dismissed. 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim only when it appears 
beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle 
the plaintiff to relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Findings of fact are not required for dismissal of a complaint under the rule. Bissett v. State, 111 
Idaho 865, 727 P.2d 1293 (Ct. App. 1986). A party may not amend his pleading after the party is 
served with a responsive pleading under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). I.R.C.P. 
15(a)(l)(B). 
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In the context of interference with an economic expectancy, "it is an issue of law for the 
court to determine whether the nature of the act complained of could be considered wrongful or 
not. In other words, the definition of what could be considered wrongful is a question of law. 
Once the act is so defined by the judge, it then becomes a jury question to determine whether the 




The time for amendment of the Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
('"Complaint.,), filed February 27, 2015, has expired by court order. 
Paragraph 17 of the Complaint alleges that Payette County entered into a conspiracy to 
cover up Sloan's alleged misconduct on the day of the accident. Paragraph 18 alleges that 
Payette County acted in furtherance of this alleged conspiracy. Paragraph 19 starkly sets forth 
the alleged facts that support Plaintiffs theory and is reproduced in its entirety. 
The defendants aJso thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff's claim and increased the 
cost in pursuing the claim. Specifically, felony criminal charges were initially filed 
against Sloan for the vehicular manslaughter of Barry Johnson, in Idaho District 
Court in Payette County, Criminal Case No. 2012-566. After a preliminary hearing 
on April 13, 2012, before the Magistrate Judge, the Court found probable cause to 
bind Sloan over to District Court to answer the felony vehicular manslaughter 
charges. The matter was ultimately set for April 22, 2013. However, the 
defendants conspired to, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence, intimidate 
witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby causing the 
prosecutor to dismiss the charges. But for the defendants' cover-up and 
interference as alleged herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan 
would have been convicted. Such conviction would have rendered liability in this 
matter res judicata. The absence of such a conviction exponentially increased the 
cost of proving liability in Plaintiff's civil case, and because of the defendants' 
evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove liability, making 
Plaintiffs civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have 
been. 
Complaint, ,i 19, pp.4-5. 
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Ergo, states Paragraph 24, Payette County was negligent per se by engaging in intentional, 
criminal behavior - bribery, tampering and intimidation of witnesses. Hence, states Paragraph 
27, she is damaged due to a "massive increase in the costs of pursuing liability." In addition, the 
lack of successful prosecution of Sloan caused "severe emotional distress and humiliation." In 
addition, states Paragraph 29, Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy (her wrongful death 
claim) that was interfered with by the alleged conspiracy.1 
There are numerous issues that demonstrate that these counts must fail as a matter of law. 
These are described individually below. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The counts are based upon speculation. 
The central claim raised by Plaintiff is that Deputy Sloan would have been convicted of 
felony vehicular manslaughter and the conviction would have been available to establish 
negligence per se, if only the prosecution had not been interfered with. It is transparent that the 
interference claims are entirely based upon this speculation and conjecture, and as such are 
incapable of proof. Speculative claims are universally subject to dismissal as improper. 
To be clear, the County's argument is not based on the relatively common disagreement 
among advocates as to speculative or provable damages. Rather, Plaintiff's claim, in and of 
itself, is premised upon a hypothetical - that Deputy Sloan would have been convicted. Setting 
aside the practical absurdity of the Plaintiff making such a conjecture, courts simply do not 
countenance claims based upon such wishful thinking. 
1 To demonstrate the porous logic of the claim, it is noted that only a conviction of vehicular manslaughter while 
DUI is admissible in a civil case. Idaho Code § 18-4006. Plaintiff does not allege Deputy Sloan was DUI. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY'S RULE 12 MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
DISMISS - P. 4 
Page 52
Although usually discussed in the context of standard of review, it is a clear tenet of law 
that "the plaintiff's case must be anchored in more than speculation .... " Mackay v. Four Rivers 
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,410, 179 P. 3d 1064 (2008). This is in keeping with the common 
law. •'The jurisprudence of this state is to the effect that where the fact of loss is itself 
speculative and based wholly on conjecture, an exception ofno cause of action will properly lie." 
Central Louisiana Electric Co. v., Pointe Coupee Electric Membership Corp., 182 So.2d 752, 
757 (La.Ct.App. 1966). "The burden of proving a cause of action is not sustained by evidence 
from which a jury can arrive at its conclusion only by guess, speculation, conjecture, or choice of 
possibilities; there must be something more which would lead a reasoning mind to one 
conclusion rather than to another." McVaney v. Baird, Holm et al. 466 Nw. 2d 499 (Neb. 1991). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously defined the term "speculation", stating: 
The word "speculation" in relationship to testimony has been defined as .. the art 
of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain 
knowledge." Black's Law Dictionary 125S (5th ed.1979). "An expert opinion that 
is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it 
would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or detennine a fact 
that is at issue." Id. (citing Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 
(1999)). Expert opinion that merely suggests possibilities would only invite 
conjecture and may be properly excluded. Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 716 P.2d 
505 (1986). 
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,565, 97 P.3d 428,432 (2004). 
Although Karlson addressed expert opinion testimony, conjectural and speculative 
allegations have been universally dismissed by courts. 
"More is needed to state a claim ... than factual allegations which are conclusory, 
vague or inherently incredible" (Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. State 
of New York; 300 A.D.2d 949, 952, 753 N.Y.S.2d 541 [2002] (citations omitted]; 
accord Matter of Abele v. Dimitriadis, 53 A.D.3d 969, 970, 862 N.Y.S.2d 182 
[2008], Iv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 706, 879 N.Y.S.2d 52, 906 N.E.2d 1086 [2009] ). 
Plaintiff appears to assert a claim of tortious interference with prospective 
inheritance based upon her observations that defendants have made home 
improvements and settled debts since decedent's death. Such speculative and 
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conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action and, in any event, 
New York does not recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with 
prospective inheritance (see Vogt v. Witmeyer, 87 N.Y.2d 998,999,642 N.Y.S.2d 
619, 665 N.E.2d 189 [1996] ). Similarly, plaintiff's factual allegations regarding 
her belief that decedent left a will, that the will named either Stephen Bracci or 
Hallock as executor of the estate, and that neither has fulfilled the duties required 
of an executor are, in our view, too speculative and conclusory to state a cause of 
action. 
O'Sullivan v. Hallock, 101 A.O.3d 1313 (N.Y.App. 2012}. 
Where a jury would be compelled to speculate upon various possible causes of an 
accident "which may be as reasonably attributed to a condition for which no 
liability attaches as to one for which it does, then the plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover, and the evidence should not be submitted to the jury" ( citations omitted). 
Smith v. Wisch, 77 A.D.2d 619 (N.Y.App. 1980). 
To establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must show a legally attributable causal 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the alleged injury. The plaintiff 
must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that 
it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of 
the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the 
matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at 
best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment 
for the defendant. 
Grinold v. Farist, 643 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. App. 2007). 
Here, the Plaintiff's cJaims are based upon an unsupportable premise, which would force 
a jury to speculate as to whether or not Deputy Sloan would have been convicted of anything, let 
alone felony vehicular manslaughter. In effect, pinning hopes on a conviction is akin to betting 
on the outcome of a contest. The California Supreme Court had a case before it in which a party 
alleged a conspiracy to affect the outcome of a horse race, and asserted that a valid e.conomic 
expectancy had been interfered with. The court rendered a thoughtful analysis on speculation as 
applied to valid economic expectancies. 
The torts of negligent or intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage require proof of various elements as a prerequisite to recovery. 
However, as a matter of law, a threshold causation requirement exists for 
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maintaining a cause of action for either tort, namely, proof that it is reasonably 
probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the 
defendant's interference 
Scholarly authority and cases from other jurisdictions agree that an application of 
the threshold requirement of probable expectancy to the area of contests in 
general will usually result in a denial of recovery. Prosser has generally remarked 
that "since a large part of what is most valuable in modem life depends on 
'probable expectancies; as social and industrial life becomes more complex the 
courts must do more to discover, define and protect them from undue 
interference." (See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 130, p. 1006, fn. 
omitted.) Prosser, however, has specifically addressed the area of interference 
with contests: "When the attempt has been made to carry liability for interference 
... into such areas as ... deprivation of the chance of winning a contest, the courts 
have been disturbed by a feeling that they were embarking upon uncharted seas, 
and recovery has been denied; and it is significant that the reason usually given is 
that there is no sufficient degree of certainty that the plaintiff ever would have 
received the anticipated benefits." 
Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 732~735 (1987) (italics in original). 
Payette County admits that the analogy is somewhat forced, but asserts that if one 
substitutes the outcome of a criminal prosecution for the outcome of a sporting contest the result 
is the same. There can be no sufficient degree of certainty of receipt of anticipated benefits. 2 
B. Plaintiff has no standing to complain about the investigation or result of a 
criminal case. 
While Plaintiff, as the daughter of the deceased, certainly had an interest in the outcome 
of the criminal case against Deputy Sloan, she was not a party. Prosecuting attorneys, as a 
matter of law, are responsible to seek criminal charges and when appropriate seek dismissal. No 
court anywhere has suggested that a third party can claim damages because someone else was 
not prosecuted, or convicted. Yet, that is precisely what Plaintiff is doing in this case. 
2 It should also be pointed out that Payette County has found no case where the issue has been discussed in the 
context of the outcome of a criminal trial. This would seem to be because no one has heretofore attempted to 
persuade a court that one should be given money because a prosecutor did not pursue a case to the satisfaction of 
that person. 
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In Paragraph 18 of the Complaint, Plaintiff lumps the Idaho State Police ("ISP") and 
Payette County together and asserts a conspiracy to protect Deputy Sloan from criminal and civil 
liability. Obviously, Payette County cannot speak for ISP, but it poses the following legal 
question: when and where has a court found that it is inappropriate to protect oneself from civil 
or criminal liability in the context of a criminal investigation? More to the point, what right is 
violated or what duty is owed to third parties during the investigation and prosecution of a 
criminal case? The answer of course is that no court has suggested that criminal investigators 
must urge prosecution against all reason, prosecutors try every case, or defendants not defend 
themselves, so that a third party may further an economic interest 
Without a duty to Plaintiff, there can be no tort. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 
90 P.3d 884 (2004). The allegation of conspiracy does not change the analysis. In Idaho "[i]t is 
quite well settled that a conspiracy to commit an actionable wrong is not in itself a cause of 
action." Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 387, 233 P. 883, 886 (1925). Instead, "[w]rongful 
acts committed by conspirators resulting in injury alone give rise to a cause of action." Id See 
Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801, 317 P .3d 698 (2013 ). 
Simply put, while it is apparent that Plaintiff feels that Payette County should have done 
more to assure a conviction, her displeasure does not transmute into a valid tort. She has no 
standing to challenge the outcome as she has no right to control that outcome and no duty was 
owed her. 
c. Count II does not properly state a claim. 
In order to properly discuss Plaintiff's Count II - interference with prospective action - it 
is necessary to analyze the genesis of the tort. 
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The tort of intentional spoliation was first recognized in Smith v. Superior Court, 198 
Cal. Rpt. 829 (1984). A California appellate court declared that "the primary function of the tort 
of intentional spoliation is to compensate for the destruction of evidence even though the 
probative value of the evidence is not known, because the accuracy of the facts related to the 
evidence will never be restored." Smith, 198 Cal. Rpt. at 832. The Smith court analogized that 
spoliation of evidence was like the tort of interference with prospective business advantage. 
"[A] prospective civil action in a product liability case is a valuable 'probable expectancy' that 
the court must protect from the kind of interference alleged herein." Id at 83 7. 
Most jurisdictions have not been persuaded by the Smith rationale and do not recognize 
intentional spoliation as a tort. There are nwnerous reasons that courts refuse do so. Primarily, 
"[ s ]peculation is a prime concern in the context of a spoliation claim because ... it is impossible 
to know what the destroyed evidence would have shown." Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield 
Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn.1990). For a list of jurisdictions 
declining to recognize the tort, and the reasons therefore, see O 'Neal v. Remington Arms 
Company, LLC, 2012 WL 3834842 (D.S. D. 2012). 
Six jurisdictions have recognized the tort of interference in a prospective action, but all in 
the context of first party spoliation only. These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Nichols v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300, 304 (Alaska 2000) (acknowledging that while first-party and third-
party intentional spoliation are tort claims, negligent spoliations are not); Connecticut, Rizzuto v. 
Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A2d 1165 (2006) ("[R]ecognition of an independent cause of 
action for intentional spoliation of evidence is necessary to fulfill public policy goals of the tort 
compensation system."); Louisiana, Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 d/b!a East 
Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 887 So.2d 524, 534 (La.Ct.App. 2004) (recognizing a state law tort claim 
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for intentional spoliation of evidence, which refers to "an intentional destruction of evidence for 
purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use); New Mexico, Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc .. 
905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M .1995) ("[W]e will recognize intentional spoliation of evidence as a 
distinct category of tort liability."); Ohio, Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 657, 660 
(Ohio 2001) ("[S]poliation of evidence may be brought after the primary action has been 
concluded only when evidence of spoliation is not discovered until after the conclusion of the 
primary action."); West Virginia, Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va.2003) (granting 
stand-alone tort status for intentional spoliation and third-party negligent spoliation, but requiring 
that the spoliator "overcome the rebuttable presumption" that "but for the fact of the spoliation of 
evidence, the party injured by the spoliation would have prevailed in the pending or potential 
litigation"). 
In Idaho, the line of cases on the tort begins with Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118 
Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101, (1990). The court discussed: 
. . . a recent innovation in tort law which has been adopted in California and 
Alaska. Smith v. Superior, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984); Hazen 
v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986). These first cases contemplated the tort 
of intentional spoliation of evidence, and the concept was expanded in another 
case to include the negligent spoliation of evidence. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. 
Maintenance Co., 169 Cal.App.3d 874,215 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1985). 
118 Idaho at 229. The court declined to adopt the "recent innovation." As can be seen, the 
court noted Smith as the genesis of the supposed tort. 
In Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,178,923 P.2d 416,423 (1996), the 
Idaho Supreme Court, in dicta, stated "for guidance in future litigation we take this opportunity 
to opine on a possible cause of action .... " The tort was described as intentional interference 
with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. Id. It was not actually adopted in the 
case before the court. Again, Smith was noted as the first example of the tort. 
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No other Idaho case has been reported since 1996 concerning this tort other than in the 
context of spoliation of evidence, and only in the context of a jury instruction. As noted in 
Ricketts v. £. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51 P.3d 392 (2002): 
The tort of intentional spoliation of evidence has been alternatively identified by 
courts as the 'intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoliation 
of evidence.'" Id at 178,923 P.2d at 423 (citing Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 
456, 463 (Alaska 1986)). The Court also stated that it is closely aligned with the 
tort of intentional interference with a prospective business advantage. Idaho First 
Nat'/ Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-87, 824 P.2d 841, 859-62 
(1991). 
Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho at 582, 51 P.3d at 396. 
The Ricketts court goes on and notes that "[t]he concept of spoliation requires a state of 
mind that shows a plan or premeditation." Ibid. 
A year later the Idaho Supreme Court expanded upon its concept of spoliation of 
evidence, stating "the circumstances must indicate that the evidence was lost or destroyed 
because the party responsible for such loss or destruction did not want the evidence available 
for use by an adverse party in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation." Courtney v. Big 0 
Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821,824, 87 P.3d 930,933 (2003). 
To complicate matters, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rpt. 829 (1984), the seminal 
case that has been spoken about in all of the above jurisdictions, and followed in some, has 
now been repudiated in California. This is best explained in Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005). The Indiana Supreme Court set forth the jurisdictions that began 
to adopt some form or another of the tort following Smith (broken down into first party, third 
party, negligent and intentional fonns), noted the disarray among the courts, and then declined 
to adopt any form of the tort. In large part, the court relied upon Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr. v. 
Superior Court. 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P .2d 511 (1998), repudiating Smith. 
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It is thus not surprising that an independent tort remedy for spoliation of evidence 
began to be recognized. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 
Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169 Cal.App.3d 
874, 215 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1985). In the subsequent intervening years, however, 
California came to question and ultimately reject this approach. In Cedars-Sinai, 
the California Supreme Court comprehensively addressed the issue, finding that 
the acknowledged harms resulting from the intentional destruction of evidence are 
"not enough to justify creating tort liability for such conduct," and declaring that 
"(w]e must also determine whether a tort remedy for the intentional first party 
spoliation of evidence would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those 
created by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and 
burdens it would impose." 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248,954 P.2d at 515. 
The opinion then more fully discussed the dangers of "creating new torts to 
remedy litigation-related misconduct" and of adopting "a remedy that itself 
encourages a spiral of lawsuits." Id It also compared spoliation to other forms of 
litigation-related misconduct, such as perjury, for which there is no tort remedy, 
and expressed its preference for policies of evidentiary inference, discovery 
sanctions, criminal penalties, civil monetary, contempt, and issue sanctions over 
derivative actions. The Cedars-Sinai court also focused on the ''uncertainty of the 
fact ofhann in spoliation cases." Id. at 518. 
Id. 
[E]ven if the jury infers from the act of spoliation that the spoliated 
evidence was somehow unfavorable to the spoliator, there will 
typically be no way of telling what precisely the evidence would 
have shown and how much it would have weighed in the spoliation 
victim's favor. Without knowing the content and weight of the 
spoliated evidence, it would be impossible for the jury to 
meaningfully assess what role the missing evidence would have 
played in the determination of the underlying action. The jury 
could only speculate as to what the nature of the spoliated evidence 
was and what effect it might have had on the outcome of the 
underlying litigation. 
The California Supreme Court also noted and discussed other factors that it 
believed weighed against the creation of a spoliation tort remedy: the "risk of 
erroneous determinations of spoliation liability," "the indirect costs by causing 
persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an indefinite 
period documents and things of no apparent value solely to avoid the possibility 
of spoliation liability if years later those items turn out to have some potential 
relevance to future litigation," the costs and burdens of "litigating meritless 
spoliation actions," and the "significant potential for jury confusion and 
inconsistency." Id. at 519-20. 
Concluding that the "incremental additional benefits a tort remedy might create" 
are outweighed by other policy considerations and costs. the Cedars-Sinai court 
denied a tort remedy for first-party intentional spoliation of evidence. Id at 521. 
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One year later, the same court similarly disapproved a tort remedy for intentional 
spoliation by a third party. [Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 84 
Cal.Rptr.2d 852,976 P.2d 223,233 (1999)]. 
824 N.E.2d at 354-355. 
So, it appears that the tort has never been actually adopted in Idaho, but it has been 
discussed in dicta, and now the underlying case for the dicta is disapproved of. 
In Yoakum, the court added more dicta, in a single sentence guaranteed to create conflict 
in future litigation: "[a]lthough not confined solely to the spoliation of evidence, a claim for 
intentional interference with a prospective civil action must nonetheless allege and prove 
conduct that amounts to an 'unreasonable interference' by the Defendant, taking into account 
any recognized privileges that party might hold." 129 Idaho at 179. Surprisingly, the Court 
cited Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986), following this remarkable 
sentence. The Hazen case did not speak to any cause of action beyond intentional interference 
with a prospective civil action by spoliation. If an intentional interference claim is viable in 
contexts beyond spoliation, the Yoakum court offered nothing by way of explanation as to the 
source of its dicta, nothing by way of example, no elements of the supposed tort, no 
limitations, no defenses beyond privilege, and no way to know how to try - or judge - the tort. 
Twenty years after Yoakum, the legal chickens have come to roost in Payette County. 
Plaintiff, apparently seizing upon the clause ''not confined solely to the spoliation of 
evidence," has alleged in Count II that: (1) Defendants were negligent by (2) "directly or 
indirectly" (3) "intimidating, harassing, corruptly persuading or engaging in misleading 
conduct toward" (4) ''witnesses or potential witnesses" (5) to withhold testimony or potential 
testimony (6) thereby disrupting Plaintiff's case, (7) increasing costs to Plaintiff, and (8) 
causing emotional distress and humiliation. 
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In other words, Plaintiff asks this court to preside over a litigation in which Defendants 
will be expected to defend against an accusation that somehow witnesses were kept from 
testifying truthfully (presumably in the criminal case) and that Plaintiff will have to spend 
more money than she otherwise might have had to spend in this case, and that she is entitled to 
general damages because of it. Needless to say, this is not a claim of spoliation. 3 
Defendants assert that there is no basis in the law to require a trial of such a facially 
absurd claim. 
1. The Law Regarding Dicta. 
The definition of obiter dictum (Latin for something said in passing) is a 'judicial 
comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion. but one that is unnecessary 
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential." Black's Law Dictionary, 7'• Ed. 
In modem parlance, the concept is usually described as dicta. Where a question is not 
before a court for decision, expressions of opinion are dicta, Long v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Idaho 
257, 90 P. 2d 973 (1939), and are binding on no one, Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P. 596 
(1925). 
Obviously, the Yoakum court's loose reference to "other forms" of interference beyond 
spoliation (while discussing a "possible" tort) was dicta as the sentence did not remotely control 
the outcome of the case, and in fact the appellants were found to have no valid claim in any 
event. There is simply no way for Plaintiff to responsibly argue that a new form of interference 
tort was created in Yoakum. 
3 More discussion on the Count's spoliation claim will be found below. 
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2. Plaintiff can neither use negligence per se to establish intentional 
tortious acts nor the cited the criminal statutes to give rise to a 
private cause of action. 
If in Idaho the tort exists, it has only been discussed as intentional interference by 
spoliation. Plaintiff cites several criminal statutes in her Complaint and then claims that these 
statutes establish the Defendants were negligent per se as to her causes of action. The initial 
problem, assuming for the moment that Plaintiff can meet the requirements of establishing a 
violation of the criminal statutes, is that negligence per se simply establishes the reasonable 
person standard for conduct in a negligence lawsuit. The crimes alleged by the Plaintiff are 
intentional, not negligent, actions. 
"Negligence per se is simply one manner of proving a common law negligence claim." 
Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 853, 172 P.3d 
1123, 1128 (2007). "(I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative 
regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such 
statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 
617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986). "In such cases, the court adopts as the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable person the requirements of the statute or regulation." Steed, 144 Idaho at 853, 
172 P.3d at t 128. 
Plaintiff cites 18 USC § 1512 (tampering with a witness), Idaho Code §18-2604 
(intimidating a witness) and Idaho Code §18-2605 (bribing a witness) within the section 
setting forth the basis to establish her tortious interference with prospective action and tortious 
interference with prospective economic advantage. As discussed below, these torts require 
intentional acts involving unreasonable interference (with prospective action) and wrongful 
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interference (with valid economic expectancy). It is impossible to establish an intentional tort 
by proving negligence. 
If instead the Plaintiff is claiming a private cause of action based upon violation of the 
criminal statutes, federal and Idaho case law have already determined that a private right of 
action under these criminal statutes does not exist. See, Ford v. Rawlinson, 2012 WL 3782455 
(D.Idaho, 2012) (no private right of action in 18 USC § 1512); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co., 129 Idaho at 176, 923 P.2d at 421 ("[a]s criminal offenses under Title 18, the Idaho 
legislature has specifically provided punishment . . . there is no indication that providing an 
additional civil remedy is necessary to assure the effectiveness of these statutes."). See also 
Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 302 P.3d 500 (Wa App. 2013) (instructions to jury on 
criminal perjury, witness tampering and witness intimidation unnecessary and confusing in a 
civil wrongful termination case); Fullerton v. Florida Medical Association, 938 So.2d 587 (FL 
App. 2006) (Under the absolute civil privilege extending to a witness's testimony, torts such as 
perjury, libel, slander, and other actions based on statements made in connection with a 
judicial proceeding are not actionable). 
In short, while it is exceedingly unclear what Plaintiff is attempting to state on this issue, 
to the extent she is trying to assert a cause of action for violation of these statutes, such must be 
dismissed. To the extent she is trying to assert that a negligent act can establish the commission 
of an intentional tort, such assertion must be rejected as a matter of law. 
3. There is no valid claim of emotional damage as a result of interference 
with an expectancy. 
In paragraph 27 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she suffered severe emotional distress 
and humiliation as a result of the alleged interference. If, as stated in Smith, the purpose of 
creating the interference tort was to compensate for the destruction of evidence, the question is: 
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how is that compensation calculated, and for what exactly? All of the above mentioned 
authorities seem to be in agreement that the calculation is an economic one (albeit very much 
speculative). No court has suggested that the damage is calculated by the alleged stress on a 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has not brought a claim of negligent or intentional of infliction of emotional 
distress. Instead, she seemingly is asking for double recovery of general damages, first because 
she claims she has to work harder than she otherwise would have to prove her case, and second 
because she is upset about that. 
There is no common law right of recovery for purely emotional trauma. Summers v. 
Western Idaho Potato Processing Co., 94 Idaho I, 479 P. 2d 292 (1970). Recovery for 
emotional trauma cannot be had in fraud cases, Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 ldaho 
211, 923 P.2d 456 (1996), or for breach of contract, Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 
1371 (1985). On the other hand, emotional injury is compensable in an insurance bad faith case 
due to the "non--cornmercial" aspect of the insurance contract and the special relationship 
between insurer and insured. Walston, supra. From this line of cases, it appears that in 
economic damage cases, unless a special relationship between the parties exists, emotional 
damage is not a source of recovery. 
Moreover, in cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress, there must be an 
assertion of physical injury. Walston, supra,· Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 627, 873 P.2d 881 (Ct. 
App. 1993). Here, no physical injury is alleged. As to intentional infliction, there must be 
distress so severe that no reasonable person would be expected to endure it. Davis v. Gage, 106 
Idaho 735,682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Id. App. 1984). Again, no such assertion is made. 
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4. An interference by spoliation claim is premature. 
Much of the Plaintiff's Complaint reads in the context of expectancy based upon a 
criminal conviction. There is enough in the Complaint, though not well stated, to imply a 
spoliation claim in the context of the current civil action. Plaintiff does not say what physical 
evidence she claims was destroyed, and does not say who destroyed it. The question then is 
whether Plaintiff can bring a spoliation claim in the same litigation as the underlying wrongful 
death claim. Put another way, Plaintiff has not tried her case to a jury. How can she state her 
case has been affected until a jury renders a verdict? 
To explain the point further, either the County is liable or it is not. In proving liability, 
assuming there really was destruction of evidence, Plaintiff will be entitled to a spoliation 
instruction. If Plaintiff prevails on the issue of liability, what possible economic gain does she 
derive from a separate claim of spoliation? What is a jury supposed to do with the claim? Give 
her more money because she had to work harder to prove liability? 
If, on the other hand, the jury was to find no liability, then, and only then, could Plaintiff 
assert that she lost because of the spoliation. Until such time, her spoliation claim is inchoate. A 
tort cause of action cannot accrue until an injury is sustained or actual damage occurs. Idaho 
Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407 (1934); City of 
McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 696, 201 P.3d 629 (2008); Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis and 
Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 341 P.3d 580 (2014) (a tort accrues when a tort is completed, an 
event that corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable occurrence of some damage). 
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With this in mind, it is appropriate to examine the litigations found in the states that 
speak to the tort of interference in a prospective action by spoliation. 4 
(a) Idaho. 
In Yoakum, supra, the parents of the deceased brought an interference claim after 
accepting an offer of judgement on the underlying wrongful death claim. 
In Ricketts, supra, and Courtney, supra, the discussion about the existence of the 
interference claim was in the context of a jury instruction. No separate interference claims were 
made in the negligence and products liability actions. 
(b) Alaska. 
In Nichols, supra, the court found no claim of negligent spoliation existed in the context 
of a claim against an insurer, separate from a claim of negligence against a third party tortfeasor. 
In Hazen, supra, the court created the new tort on appeal after the plaintiff's case had 
been dismissed, and did not suggest the spoliation tort should be tried at the same time that the 
false arrest claim was to be retried. 
(c) Connecticut 
In Rizzuto, supra, plaintiff, in response to an argument that his spoliation claim was 
untimely, withdrew his product liability claim and substituted an interference by spoliation 
claim. 
(d) Louisiana. 
In Desselle, supra, the court upheld a district judge, who in a bench trial ruled that a 
plaintiff could not recover for spoliation, where the plaintiff recovered for negligence arising 
from a use of a defective gurney. 
4 It bears repeating that all the below cases discuss the tort in the context of physical destruction of physical objects, 
usually ladders or similar devices. Not a single case stands for the proposition that conversations with witnesses 
imply interference. 
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(e) New Mexico. 
In Coleman, supra, a plaintiff sued her employer for spoliation in a case separate from a 
suit for products liability against several manufacturers. 
(/) West Virginia. 
In Hannah, supra, the court discussed the spoliation tort in the context of a stand~alone 
counterclaim. 
(g) Ohio. 
As ever in the law, one can always find something of an outlier. Ohio may be it. In 
Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 2001), the court stated that spoliation of 
evidence may be brought after the primary action has been concluded only when evidence of 
spoliation is not discovered until after the conclusion of the primary action. The court followed 
its own law, set forth in Smith v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (1993), in which the 
court, devoting only a single dependent clause to the issue, stated "such a claim may be brought 
at the same time as the primary action." The Ohio rule has been the subject of some debate. As 
the partially concurring justice pointed out in Davis, "I agree with the majority's finding that our 
use of the word 'may' certainly does not imply that such a claim must be brought at the same 
time as the primary action. To the contrary, a claim for damages under Smith may-and in the 
majority of cases most likely will-be brought after entry of the judgment in the primary action." 
765 N.E. 2d at 660. The dissent pointed out that the majority's conclusion was "bereft of 
substantive analysis." 765 N.E. 2d at 662. The dissent also pointed out the "precarious status 
nationwide" of the tort, given the repudiation of Smith by the Cedars-Sinai court. Id., note 2. 
Given that it is unclear that the tort exists in Idaho at all. and given that the seminal case 
for the tort is disavowed, and given that the vast majority of states do not recognize that the tort 
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should not be tried along with the underlying action, the spoliation portion of the claim should be 
dismissed as premature. 
D. There can be no valid economic expectancy in one's own civil lawsuit. 
Count III sets out an alternative theory. Presumably because of the failure to prosecute 
Deputy Sloan, Plaintiff claims her economic advantage was disrupted. 
To establish a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, 
the Plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the 
expectancy; (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself; and (5) resulting damage to the Plaintiff whose expectancy has been 
disrupted. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 
(2010). For purposes of this motion, the first issue is whether Plaintiff can assert a valid 
economic expectancy in her own lawsuit against the County. 
No Idaho case supports such an assertion, but one state has dealt explicitly with it and 
was dispositive of the issue. In Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 7 P .3d 677 (Or. 
App. 2000), the plaintiffs asserted interference with prospective economic advantage in their 
own wrongful death lawsuit. 
[T]he question before us is limited to whether the economic relationship alleged 
in plaintiff's Complaint, viz .. "the economic advantages and relations contained in 
the lawsuit of Fox v. Vincent," is a business relationship or expectancy for 
purposes of the tort of intentional interference with economic relations. We 
conclude that it is not. 
Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 7 P.3d at 688. After quoting at length from Allen v. 
Hall, 974 P.2d 199 (Or. 1999), which created the tort of interference with an inheritance, the 
court discussed at length the reasons why no such tort existed with regard to one's own lawsuit. 
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We recognize at the outset that a civil lawsuit represents a prospective economic 
advantage. In any civil action for damages, the plaintiffs claim represents an 
expectancy in a monetary recovery that is the object of the litigation. And, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Allen, many of the commercial interests that have been 
associated with, and are protected by, the tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations are purely prospective in nature. . . . Indeed, at least with 
respect to the nature of the economic advantage at issue, an expectancy in a 
settlement or judgment in a civil lawsuit is no different from an expectancy in an 
inheritance or a prospective commercial arrangement. 
Notwithstanding that similarity, there are material distinctions between a civil 
lawsuit and other relationships and interests to which the Supreme Court has 
extended the protections of the tort of intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage. Because of those dissimilarities, we decline to extend the 
tort into this context: 
First, the essential purpose of the tort is to protect the integrity of, and 
expectancies in, voluntarily-created economic relationships. Conversely, a civil 
lawsuit is an involuntary relationship that is adversarial in nature. In its earliest 
and most basic form, the purpose of the tort was to protect '1he interest of the 
individual in the security and integrity of the contractual relations in which he has 
entered." . . . As courts expanded the tort to protect prospective relations, it 
encompassed "any prospective contractual relations • • * which would be of 
pecuniary value to the plaintiff," see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B 
comment c (1974), and which were uniformly voluntary in nature. See id. 
("Included are interferences with the prospect of obtaining employment or 
employees, the opportunity of selling or buying land or chattels or services, and 
any other relations leading to potentially profitable contracts [including] a 
continuing business or other customary relationship not amounting to a formal 
contract."). Thereafter, courts began to recognize "intentional interference with 
inheritance or gift," considering it as an "extension of the principle found in 
liability for intentional interference with prospective contracts." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts§ 774B comment a (1974). 
Thus, while courts have expanded the tort to protect additional types of 
relationships, its purpose has been constant: To protect the integrity of voluntary 
economic relationships, both commercial and noncommercial, that would have 
very likely resulted in a pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff but for the defendant's 
interference. We further observe that the relationships protected by the tort are, by 
virtue of their "voluntariness," the products of the parties' free and voluntary 
actions as autonomous individuals. Thus, in the abstract, the tort serves the 
essential purpose of protecting the basic right of the individual to conduct his or 
her economic affairs autonomously, viz .. without interference. 
Protection of a prospective interest in the outcome of civil litigation does not 
comport with that essential purpose. A lawsuit is, by its nature, an involuntary 
relationship. In fact, the only basis for the relationship between opposing parties 
in a lawsuit is a dispute. The integrity of an actual or putative mutually voluntary 
relationship is not implicated. 
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Second, courts have not historically afforded prospective interests in the outcome 
of civil litigation the same level of common-law protection extended to 
prospective contracts or prospective inheritances. ... Although interests in 
litigation are certainly afforded some common-law protection, e.g., legal 
malpractice. we have found no reported decision from any jurisdiction in which a 
court has extended the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage to protect civil litigation .... 
Allen represents our Supreme Court's furthest extension of the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage. Unlike in Allen, the 
relationship and resulting prospective interest here was not voluntary and, thus, 
the alleged interference did not implicate the tort's essential purpose. Unlike in 
Allen, where other courts had traditionally and consistently protected expectancies 
in inheritance, no reported decision has extended the tort to apply in this context. 
Given those distinctions, we decline to go further. 
In so concluding, we emphasize the precise and limited nature of our holding. We 
decide only that plaintiff failed to state a claim for intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage. That holding is based on the peculiar character 
and requisites of that tort. We do not address, much less purport to preclude, the 
availability of other tort causes of action, including fraud, in analogous 
circumstances. 
Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 1 P.3d at 688-689. (emphasis added, internal case 
citations omitted). 
It is submitted that the logic and holding of Fox are applicable here. Obviously, if a 
claim could be made for a valid economic interest in one's own lawsuit, then any defense action 
could be subject to an interference claim. As demonstrated in Fox, that was not the intent when 
the courts created the tort. 
Even if the tort exists, Plaintiff cannot claim that her expectancy was terminated. The 
word termination is defined as "the end of something in time or existence, conclusion or 
discontinuance." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Ed As demonstrated above, the elements of the 
tort require interference inducing termination of the expectancy. Wesco Autobody, supra. All 
Idaho cases on the subject are in accord. See Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, 
154 Idaho 824, 303 P.3d 183 (2013) (appellant did not '"lose" an economic expectancy). 
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So what expectancy has Plaintiff lost? It cannot be her wrongful death claim as she is 
going forward with that claim in Count I. The only thing she can point to is the inability to 




So the question is - what should the court do here? The following rulings are requested. 
First, the court should reject the notion that Plaintiff should be able to argue to the jury that she 
was damaged because Deputy Sloan was not convicted of a felony, and any claim based on that 
notion should be dismissed. Assuming any part of Counts II or III survive, the court should rule 
that one does not have a valid economic expectancy in one's own case, thereby dismissing Count 
III. Next, the court should reject that portion of Count II regarding interference based upon 
allegations of influencing witnesses as opposed to actual destruction or concealment of physical 
evidence. That portion of the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Similarly, the 
claim that the alleged interference caused emotional damage should similarly be dismissed with 
prejudice. Finally, the Court should dismiss with prejudice the portion of Count II based on 
negligence. 
The only remaining part of Count II is the spoliation of evidence claim as to the current 
civil suit. The court must determine whether the tort even exists in Idaho, given that it has never 
been officially adopted, and given that its fundamental underpinning (Smith) has been 
repudiated. Despite the Yoakum dicta, this is an issue of first impression. The County asserts 
that it is not a viable tort, as it is based primarily upon speculation. This has been the finding of 
the vast majority of courts throughout the nation. 
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If the court determines that the tort exists, it should dismiss it without prejudice untiJ a 
jury verdict on the underlying case is reached. 
#-
DATED this 7 day of October, 2016. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
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Case No. CV-2015-00954-C 
DEFENDANT PAYETTE 
COUNTY'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL DISMISSAL 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, PAYETTE COUNTY, by and through its attorney of record, 
Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for 
partial dismissal based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6). 
This Motion is based on the files and records maintained herein, along with a Memorandum 
in Support filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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JACKIE RAYMOND, inilividually as an heir, 




IDAHO STATE POUCR, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETI'E COlJNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State orrdaho, and SCOTI 
SLOAN, 
Defendants. 
DEFRNDAN'f IDAIIO STATK 
POLICE'S JOINDER IN 
PAYETTE COUNTY'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. l2(h){6) 
COMES NOW Dctbn.da.nt Idaho Stale Police (ISP), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Moore & Rlia, LLP, and hereby suhmitci its Joinder to Defendant Payette County's 
Motion for Prutial Dismis.':lal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. ·12(h)(6). ISP hereby adopts and joins in 
Payette County's Motion and Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Dismissal 
Pursuant to I.R..C.P. 12(b)(6), nlcd October 7, 2016, 
Plainlills have named TSP a.~ a Defendant in Connts 11 (fortious T11tc,1fc.rcnce with 
Prospective Adion) and Count T1I (Tortious Jnlerlett.-ncc with a Prospective Economic 
Advantage). TSP is not named as a Defendant in Counl T of Plaintiffs Complaint. Therefore, by 
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way <.lf this Joinder, ISP is seeking ~U dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit. In addition tu the hricfing 
set forth by .Payette County, TSP ~ubmits the following: 
A. Phtintil'rs Claims of Tortlou11 Interference with Prospective Action and Tortious 
Interference with .Prospective F..conomic Advantage arc attempt, to artfully plead 
around the Negligent Investigation, which ni not recognized 1mdcr Idaho law. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that during the ISP peer mvicw process of the investigation 
of lhe Octoher I 8, 2011 accident between Deputy Sloan and decedent Ran-y Johnson, ISP 
employees "conspired and attempted t.o. and did. cover up Sloan's misconduct/and or unduly 
influence the .investigation" and "conceal[ ed] evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal 
aml civH tiahility.'1 Complaint, ut 117. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants thereby reduced the 
value of Pluinti1l's claim and increased the cost of pursuing the claim. Plaintiff goes on to claim: 
Id. ,tt 119. 
fblut for the deJendants' cover-up and interl~ence ... the 
matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan would have been 
convicte::d. Such conviction would have rendered lia.bility in this 
roatler res Judlcata. The ahi1encc of such a C<mviction 
exponentially increased the cost of providing liability in Plaintiff's 
civil case, and because the def-eridants• evidence tampering ha!-! 
made it more dil11eult to prove liability, making Plaintiff's civil 
claim significantly les.'l valuable than it otherwhie would have 
been. 
Under Idaho law, no tort exist.'! 1hr negligent investigation. Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 
923,925, 841 P,2d 453,455 (Ct. App. 1992); llagy v. State, 137 Jdaho 618, 622, 51 P.3d 432, 
436 (Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiff's Complaint is an example of artful pleading, .in which lhe 
Plaintiff attempts to phrase her claims against De.fondant ISP in terms thul. conlu.cie and obfuscate 
the trne gravamen of the action upon which relief can be grun loo. 
1n Wimer, lhe plaintiffs, two hunters, brought general negligence claims against Idaho 
Fish and Grune employees for negligently investigating the illegal killing of an elk. 122 Idaho at 
454. The alleged negligent conduct of th" Fish and Game omcers was their failure to examine 
uml compare the tire 1read on the plaintiffs' vehicle with those at the kill site, and for failing tn 
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disclose to lhe magistrate that the witness providing information was a suspected poucher. Id 
The two argued that the acts of the officers "'constitule[dJ a wrongftd act or omission.,, that 
violated the officers' general duty of care, but did not fall under the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
malicious pmsecution, abuse of process, o:r discretionary function exemptions contained in I.C. § 
6-904. Id. 
The Wimer Court began iti; analyi,,is by recognizing that. the claims against the State can 
succeed only if a ''private person or entity would be liable for money damages undci· the laws 
under the state of Idaho." Id. The lTCA does not create any new torts that do not exist at 
common Jaw or pursuant to statute. Id. Dismissing the plaintHls' claims, the Cotut noted lb.al 
Idaho does not recogni:1.e the tort of negligent investigation. Jd.; See also Hagy v. State, 137 
Idaho 618, 621, 51 P.3d 432, 435 (C..'t. App. 2002) (holding that brother's claim uguini;l city and 
county for negligent il.1ve1>iigu.tion of his mentally ill si~ier's death was not a cause or action 
recognized under Idaho law). Nor does Idaho allow recovery for general negligence in 
investigating or prosecuting a crime, as "the policy lhat to hold investigators Hable for their 
negligent ucts would impair vigorou.'I prosecution and have a chilling effect on law 
enforcement." !ti. at 455. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' theories of negligence und 
negligent investigation fu]} ~horl on their own merit. Id. at 466. 
In dicta, lhe Wimer Court also addro.qscd the plaintiffs' attempt to disguise thei.r claims 
for negligent investigation as ones of general negligence. The Court begins by stating thal 
plaintills failed to cite any ca.'le law from Idaho o:r other jurisdictlo.ns recognizing the tort of 
negligent investigation, and "on the other band, recovery for negligence in h~vestigating or 
_pmsecuting a crime ha.q been specifically denied in a number ol'jurisdictions." Wimer, 122 Idaho 
1.tl 925. Summarizing lhe State's argument the Court wrote: 
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[t]he state contends that notwithstanding the plainlifls' efforts to 
phrase their c]aim against the defendants in terms of "neglig1:mcc," 
the true nature ol' the action is one for .malicious prosecution and 
abuse of process, falling squarely within the exceplion to 
governmental liability a11brded by J.C. § 6 -904 ... While the 
argument of the state is persuasive and is consistent with the views 
we ex.press here, we do not need to disCLL'IS it further. For the 
reasons slat.tu), we have determined that the slate is entitled to 
judgment as a matter o f'Jaw on the theories urbred by pla.inH fls. 
Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 926, 841 P.2cl 453, 456 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this c1lse, the Plaintiff alleges that Defe,nwmt ISP engaged in tortious intetlercncc with 
the Plaintiff's prospective action and economic advantage. J.,jke the plaintiffs in Wim,~r, Ms. 
Raymond's actual claim is grounded in lf11 allegation of negligent investigation into her father's 
car accident. Plainti:trs claims in this case arc tm ullempt lo plead around a claim ol' negligent 
investigation, which is not recogni:1.eJ under ldaho law. As the Court recognized in Wimer, ff the 
foctt1 taken together amount to a claim that is not recognized, t1uch as 1,cgligcnt investigation, 
misrepresenting the real claim docs not. create a cogni:1.ahlc cause of action. Wimer, 122 Idaho at 
925-6. 
CONCJ,URTON 
ISP respecllully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs remaining claims of tortious 
interference with prospective action and tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage agairu;t J)efendant ISP based upon the failure to state a cluim. 
lutS DATED this ,_ diy oJ'Novcmbcr, 2016. 
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Case No. CV-2015-00954-C 
PAYETTE COUNTY'S REPLY 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW the Defendant, PAYETTE COUNTY, by and through their attorney of 
record, Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and hereby provides the 
following Reply Brief in support of its Motion for Partial Dismissal. 
Plaintiff affects to find it "astonishing" that Payette County asserts that it is outside the 
law of Idaho to premise a claim on the notion that because an employee of the County was not 
convicted of a crime, Plaintiff is owed money. Yet Plaintiff provides the court with virtually 
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nothing that demonstrates the numerous cases cited to the court by the County are either 
erroneous or distinguishable. In fact, Plaintiff does not even attempt to address some of the legal 
points made by the County at all. It is ironic that Plaintiff claims the County is "cherry picking" 
cases when she fails to demonstrate how any of them are inapplicable. 
To be clear, there is no question that an auto accident occurred and that Mr. Johnson was 
killed in the accident. That is the crux of the wrongful death case. The question is whether the 
Plaintiff can bring separate claims in the same action by stating as a given that the deputy 
involved in the accident would have been convicted, and base her claims entirely upon this 
unknowable and unprovable assertion. Facially absurd assertions (that the case was "open and 
shut" and that criminal liability was .. indisputable") are not substitutes for substantive law. 
Plaintiff devotes four pages of briefing on the law of speculative damages. The County 
expressly pointed out that the problem with Plaintiff's claim is that it is not about damage 
calculations, but rather that it is based upon a hypothetical. The County pointed out that any 
claim, no matter how denoted, that would force a jury to guess or speculate is improper. Plaintiff 
has failed to even address these cases, let alone show that they are wrong or irrelevant. Simply 
put, litigation cannot be brought upon speculative, conclusory or inherently incredible 
allegations. In the context of valid economic expectancies, this was the message of Youst v. 
Longo, 729 P.2d 728, (Cal. 1987). There has to be a sufficient degree of certainty in obtaining 
the supposed benefits of the expectancy. No reasonably responsible person would argue there is 
certainty in any criminal trial. Moreover, there is a significant question as to whether a 
conviction for vehicular homicide outside of a case involving a DUI is even admissible in a civil 
case. See Idaho Code § 18-4006. Even if it was admissible for non-law enforcement 
individuals, it very well might not be here, given the different standards of fault required in law 
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enforcement cases. This is so because gross negligence might be enough for a conviction, but a 
higher standard of fault is required in civil actions. See Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 196 P.3d 
325 (2008) (reckless disregard for the safety of others, not gross negligence, is required). 
Plaintiff has not rebutted the point that the fact that the deputy was not prosecuted cannot 
be a tort because no duty was owed to the Plaintiff. Prosecutors can, and do, move to dismiss 
cases for any number of reasons. If there was truly any substance to Plaintiffs claims of 
intentional misconduct by unnamed investigators, there are criminal laws that speak to the matter 
that can be utilized by proper authorities. As pointed out by the County, the law is clear that a 
breach of those criminal laws does not transmute into tort liability, especially as to someone who 
has no legal authority to interfere in the process of decision-making or has a personal stake in 
that decision- making. Hence, the County acknowledges the language cited by Plaintiff from the 
Restatement 2d of Torts, but points out that the sections referred to speak to intentional causation 
of injury. A person is not injured when another person is not prosecuted. 
Plaintiff does not rebut the County's point that one cannot have a valid economic 
expectancy in one's own lawsuit. The logic of Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 7 
P.3d 677 (Or. App. 2000), the only case found that speaks to the issue, is unassailable. Plaintiff 
seemingly concedes the points made in Fox. 
Assuming plaintiff can somehow get past the aforementioned issues, the central question 
remaining is whether there is a valid tort in the state of Idaho called interference with prospective 
action, and if so whether the actions described by Plaintiff fall within the tort. If the answer to 
both questions is yes, is the tort ripe for litigation? 
The County took pains to demonstrate the gestation of the potential tort in Idaho, pointed 
out that it was last discussed in any substantive way some twenty years ago in Yoakum v. 
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416,423 (1996), and pointed out that it was 
discussed in the context of a possible cause of action but not expressly adopted or used in the 
case. The County pointed that the tort bas been rejected in most jurisdictions, and that the 
seminal case that started the gestation of the tort in California, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. 
Rpt. 829 (1984), has now been repudiated. Finally, the County pointed out that in the few 
jurisdictions that have adopted the tort. all were in the context of destruction of evidence, 
whereas the plaintiff's claim was primarily based upon allegations of witness tampering in an 
unconnected criminal matter. The County pointed out that in the context of the allegations in 
this case, the issue is one of first impression. 
The County went to these lengths because such an analysis was necessary for the court to 
make an informed decision. It hoped that by shedding more light than heat on a highly complex 
issue, the court could more easily pick through the legal minefield, and determine if the tort even 
exists in Idaho, and if it does then give guidance as to its limits. 
In response, Plaintiff has ignored most of the law cited, most especially that Smith, supra, 
has been repudiated, and acts as if Yoakum, supra, is the be-all and end-all as to his witness 
tampering claim, despite the fact that no other jurisdiction has adopted the tort in that context. 
This approach is not at all helpful to the analysis. 
Plaintiff cites the Ohio case of Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 
28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037, as recognizing and adopting a cause of action for interference or 
destruction of evidence. However, as noted in the later Ohio cases, the courts have limited this 
recognition to only destruction of physical evidence. Pratt v. Payne, 153 Ohio App. 3d 450, 454, 
794 N.E.2d 723, 726-28(2003) ("After Smith, no court in Ohio (at least that our research has 
disclosed) has extended spoliation to anything other than the destruction of physical evidence.") 
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Plaintiff also relies upon a New Jersey case which has since been modified by its 
appellate court. Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 766 A.2d 749 (2001), when reviewing 
Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. 113, 119-120, 597 A.2d 543 (App.Div.1991), noted that: 
Although some commentators have interpreted Viviano and its progeny as having 
created a new tort of intentional spoliation, Adamski, supra, 32 J. Marshall L.Rev. 
at 332; Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence-
Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 La. L.Rev. 
837 (1998), we do not read our case law that way. To be sure, Viviano identified 
intentional spoliation of litigation evidence as wrongful conduct and also 
identified a tort remedy for that wrong. However, that tort remedy was not novel, 
but merely an invocation of the previously recognized tort of fraudulent 
concealment, adapted to address concealment or destruction during or in 
anticipation of litigation. 
Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 405-06, 766 A.2d 749, 756-57 (2001). The elements of 
the tort of fraudulent concealment are: (1) that defendants had a legal obligation to disclose the 
evidence to plaintiff; (2) that the evidence was material to plaintiffs case; (3) that plaintiff could 
not have readily learned of the concealed information without defendant disclosing it; (4) that 
defendant intentionally failed to disclose the evidence to plaintiff; and (5) that plaintiff was 
harmed by relying on the nondisclosure. Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 NJ.Super. 222, 
258, 628 A. 2d 1108 (Law Div.1993). Clearly then, Viviano has no application to this case for the 
reason that the investigators in the criminal case had no legal obligation to disclose any evidence 
to plaintiff. Neither Smith nor Viviano can be used as support for a new tort for witness 
tampering in an unconnected criminal matter. 
Plaintiff further fails to respond to the legal points made regarding the Plaintiff's claim of 
negligent conduct leading to interference. The point of the discussion was that one cannot use 
negligence as an element in the performance of an intentional tort. Plaintiff admits that she is not 
attempting to assert independent torts under the criminal statutes. However, she accuses ISP of 
gross negligence in the investigation. If Yoakum stands for anything, which is very much in 
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doubt, it certainly cannot be used as support for a tort of negligent investigation or similar 
conduct. It only discussed the "possible" tort in the context of intentional destruction of 
evidence. 
Plaintiff also fails to respond to the points made by the County that one cannot collect 
money for emotional injury in the context of an interference claim. 
So, as asked in the original brief in support of the County's motion, what is the court to 
do with this steaming mess of a potential tort? Given the state of the law as of today, instead of 
twenty years ago, it is fairly clear that the existence of the tort of interference with prospective 
action is in doubt. Most of the courts throughout the country, including the state where the tort 
began, have found that the tort is too speculative. It certainly would be here, where the 
allegations begin with a hypothetical to the effect that it was a given that the deputy would have 
been convicted. But that aside, there never was a trial, so how can it be proven that (a) because 
some unknown witnesses were talked to by some unnamed party, (b) a conviction was prevented, 
so (c) Plaintiff is entitled to money? Viewed in this way, it is clear that Plaintiffs case is 
speculation piled upon speculation, which is why most jurisdictions have declined to go down 
the road the Yoakum court spoke about but did not go down. For this reason, the court should 
reject Count II. 
But assuming the court finds that the tort exists in Idaho, the court should not expand it 
beyond intentional destruction of evidence. No court, anywhere, has gone in that direction. 
Hence, all of the claims based upon anything other than intentional spoliation should be rejected. 
If the tort exists in the context of intentional spoliation, is it appropriate to litigate it at the 
same time as the wrongful death action? The County pointed out that if Plaintiff prevails on the 
wrongful death action, there is nothing to litigate. Only if Plaintiff does not prevail, (and she 
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would be entitled to a spoliation instruction if she can demonstrate real destruction) only then 
might she have a real claim as opposed to an inchoate one. Once again, Plaintiff failed to 
respond to the County's points on this issue. 
Putting it bluntly, why should the court clutter up a relatively straightforward wrongful 
death trial with allegations that some unknown parties tried to help the deputy in his criminal 
case? As far as liability is concerned, either the deputy was driving with reckless disregard or he 
wasn't. Either Mr. Johnson was comparatively negligent or he wasn't. What does a second trial 
on the issue of witness tampering in the unconnected criminal matter add to or take away from 
the question of liability for the accident? If Plaintiff can identify some physical evidence 
destroyed by the County (not some third party) that goes to the issue of liability, she will be 
entitled to a spoliation instruction. The thumb will be on the scale against the County. What 
more could the Plaintiff want? 
The painful truth is transparent in the Complaint and the briefing. Plaintiff does not want 
to let the fact that the deputy was not prosecuted go. That may or may not be understandable, 
but it has nothing to do with a comparative negligence calculation. There is simply no law that 
will allow Plaintiff to keep pushing the issue in the context of trying an auto accident. It simply 
makes no sense to try this very questionable tort at the same time as the trial of the accident. 
J ;'; ,,. 
DATED this ,-3 day ofNovember, 2016. 
a -
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BY:_~---~--
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorneys for Payette County Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12._ day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to 
the following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
[Facsimile: #(208) 524-3391] 
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com1 
Counsel for ISP 
Michael J. Elia 
Moore & Elia, LLP 
P. 0. Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83 707 
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031] 
[Email: mjera.>,melawfirrn.net] 
Courtesy CoJ?Y To: 
Sheri McCain 
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye 
Canyon County Court 
[Email: secsm@canyonco.org1 
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Attorneys for Defendant Idaho State Police 
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IDAHO ST A TE POLICE, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT 
SLOAN, 
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Case No. CV-2015-00954-C 
DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE 
POLICE'S JOINDER IN 
PAYETTE COUNTY'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
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COMES NOW Defendant Idaho State Police (ISP), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Moore & Elia, LLP, and hereby submits its Joinder to Payette County's Reply to 
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's Rule 12 Motion for Partial 
Dismissal. ISP hereby adopts and joins in Payette County's Reply to Plaintiff's Response in 
Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12 Motion for Partial Dismissal, filed November 21, 2016. 
ISP therefore requests the Court dismiss Counts II and III of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane Associates 
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701-2865 
Attorneys for Defendants Payette County and 
Scott Sloan 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
v Facsimile Transmission 208-524-3391 
__ E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
-✓-----Facsimile Transmission 208-342-2323 
__ E-Mail: mkane@ktlaw.net 
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Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
E-mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
PAY£T1£ COUNTY, IDAHO 
NOV 2 5 2016 
B .ORESSEN,CLERK 
-14~----EPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, 
and as Personal Representative of the Estate 
of BARRY JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IDAHO ST ATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT 
SLOAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2015-954 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS PAYETTE COUNTY'S 
RULE 12 MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
DISMISS 
Plaintiff, Jackie Raymond (Raymond), by and through counsel of record provides the 
following response in opposition to "Defendant Payette County's (Payette) Rule 12 Motion for 
Partial Dismiss" as joined by the Idaho State Police (ISP) This response is supported by the 
pleadings in this case. 
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SUMMARY 
Under this motion, Payette and ISP urge the Court to dismiss Raymond's tortious 
interference claims - even accepting all of her deeply troubling allegations as true. Simply put, 
nothing prevents this Court from allowing Raymond to pursue her causes of action against the 
defendants for their direct role and conspiracy (as the case may be) to commit the willful and 
extraordinarily harmful acts that damaged Raymond after the death of her father, Barry Johnson. 
In many respects, the Court is faced with previously untried claims in the State ofldaho. 
However, Raymond has based her claims on fundamental principles of tort as well as recognized 
causes of action in Idaho, as well as other jurisdictions. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
The defendants' motion attempts to downplay or disregard the deeply troubling 
allegations set forth in Raymond's February 27, 2015, Complaint. makes the following 
allegations, which for the purposes oflSP's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion must be considered as if true: 
11. On or about October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson was operating his 1983 Jeep CJ7 on 
Idaho State Highway 30 in an easterly direction, when he made a lawful turn into 
the driveway of his residence just outside New Plymouth, Idaho. 
12. As Mr. Johnson was making his lawful left turn into his driveway, Defendant 
Scott Sloan was attempting to pass Mr. Johnson on the left, at speeds as high as 
115 mph according to initial ISP investigation, a speed Sloan knew to be far too 
great for any evasive maneuvers in the likely event he would need to avoid lawful 
action by other motorists like Mr. Johnson. 
13. Sloan was personally aware that driveways from private residences and farms 
lined Highway 30, and that pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists often entered and 
exited Highway 30 from their residences or farms. 
14. By driving at such a speed grossly in excess of the posted speed limit and in such 
a populated area with visible traffic, Sloan endangered life and property, drove 
without due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, and recklessly 
disregarded the safety of others using highway, in violation ofldaho law and 
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certain Idaho State statutes, including but not limited to Idaho Code §§ 49-654, 
49-623, and 49-625, thereby rendering Sloan negligent per se. 
15. As a direct and proximate result of Sloan's misconduct, his patrol car collided 
with Mr. Johnson's Jeep in an extremely violent manner and at an extreme rate of 
speed, ejecting Mr. Johnson as well as the engine and drive train from the Jeep, 
killing Mr. Johnson. 
16. Based upon information and belief, Payette County was aware of Sloan's 
propensity to speed, drive recklessly, and flout the very laws he enforced, yet 
failed to take reasonable measures to reign him in, and failed to develop rules and 
to properly train, supervise, and control its Deputies, including Sloan, in the safe 
operation of patrol cars when responding to a code call or pursuing a suspect, 
which was a substantial factor causing damages to Plaintiff. 
17. During ISP's investigation of the misconduct of defendant Sloan as alleged, and 
prosecution of Sloan therefor, the defendants conspired and attempted to, and did, 
cover up Sloan's misconduct and/or unduly influence the investigation, evidence, 
and witnesses accordingly, in order to shield defendants Sloan and Payette County 
from liability and responsibility for Sloan's aforesaid misconduct. 
18. The defendants engaged in an enterprise or conspiracy with Sloan to, and did in 
fact, willfully and with full knowledge of Sloan's unlawful conduct, conceal 
evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and 
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or 
potential witnesses, all in violation of state and federal law but in favor of a 
corrupt policy and effort to protect fellow Idaho law enforcement officers from the 
consequences of their unlawful conduct. 
19. The defendants also thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff's claim and increased 
the cost in pursuing the claim. Specifically, felony criminal charges were initially 
filed against Sloan for the vehicular manslaughter of Bany Johnson, in Idaho 
District Court in Payette County, Criminal Case No. 2012-566. After a 
preliminary hearing on April 13, 2012, before the Magistrate Judge, the Court 
found probable cause to bind Sloan over to District Court to answer the felony 
vehicular manslaughter charges. The matter was ultimately set for April 22, 2013. 
However, the defendants conspired to, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence, 
intimidate witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby 
causing the prosecutor to dismiss the charges. But for the defendants' cover-up 
and interference as alleged herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and 
Sloan would have been convicted. Such conviction would have rendered liability 
in this matter res judicata. The absence of such a conviction exponentially 
increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintiff's civil case, and because of the 
defendants' evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove liability, 
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making Plaintitrs civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would 
have been. 
COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ACTION 
24. The defendants were negligent per se, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and Idaho 
Code§§ 18-2604 & 2605, in directly or indirectly intimidating, harassing, 
corruptly persuading or engaging in misleading conduct toward, witnesses or 
potential witnesses in order to influence or cause to the withholding of their 
testimony or potential testimony. 
25. The defendants' wrongful interference was wrongful beyond the fact of the 
interference itself, inter alia, because violated the aforesaid Idaho statutes. 
26. The defendants knew litigation was likely to occur as a result of Sloan's 
misconduct as alleged above, and willfully destroyed or concealed evidence in an 
effort to disrupt Plaintiffs case, thereby disrupting Plaintiffs case as alleged 
above. 
27. Such conduct resulted in disruption of Plaintiffs case, and damages to Plaintiff, 
including but not limited to a massive increase in the costs of pursuing liability of 
the wrongful death claims, a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing 
interest from the significant delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages 
including severe emotional distress and humiliation suffered by Plaintiff. 
COUNT III - (IN THE ALTERNATIVE) 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADV ANT AGE 
28. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 27 above as if fully restated 
herein. 
29. Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy known to the defendants in the form of 
Plaintiffs claims and causes of action against Sloan and Payette County arising 
from the death of Mr. Johnson. 
30. The defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs valid economic 
expectancy, resulting in the reduction, destruction, or disruption thereof. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' misconduct alleged above, 
Plaintiffs ability to obtain legal redress for their injuries has been significantly 
impaired. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Totality of Raymond's Allegations of Intentional Misconduct and/or Gross 
Negligence by the Defendants Easily Justify a Tort Claim. 
When ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must "accept all factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Mosvesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2010)( citations 
omitted.) Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In their Rule 12 Motion, the defendants (in particular Payette) attempt to parse out, 
diminish and even disregard the allegations and claims made by Raymond in her complaint. For 
instance, Payette attempts to "boil down" Raymond's claim to: "because she has to prove 
liability (in a wrongful death suit) she has been damaged." (Mem. Supp. MTD p. 2) Similarly, 
the ISP characterizes Raymond's allegations against it as merely "negligent investigation." (ISP 
Joinder pp. 2-3.) They then scour jurisdictions throughout the country to cherry pick various 
appellate decisions with entirely different facts and claims, in an attempt to deprive Raymond her 
day in court. 
Raymond's complaint in its entirety, if taken as true, describes a deeply troubling pattern 
of conduct that clearly warrants a triable claim. In essence, the complaint alleges that the 
defendants-who were charged with the fiduciary duty to investigate the death of Raymond's 
father Mr. Johnson and help make anyone who was wrongfully responsible for his death 
accountable - instead engaged in a concerted effort and conspiracy to protect the person 
wrongfully responsible for Mr. Johnson's death (Scott Sloan). Such conduct included far more 
than a sub-par investigation and even spoliation of evidence, but alleged that the defendants did: 
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conceal evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and 
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or 
potential witnesses, all in violation of state and federal law but in favor of a corrupt 
policy and effort to protect fellow Idaho law enforcement officers from the consequences 
of their unlawful conduct...(and that such conduct constituted a violation of) 18 U.S.C. § 
1512 and Idaho Code§§ 18-2604 & 2605, in directly or indirectly intimidating, harassing, 
corruptly persuading or engaging in misleading conduct toward, witnesses or potential 
witnesses in order to influence or cause to the withholding of their testimony or potential 
testimony ... (Complain par's 18 and 24.) 
The complaint also alleges that such egregious conduct not only "would have rendered 
liability in this matter res judicata, " but also resulted in "a massive increase in the costs of 
pursuing liability of the wrongful death claims, a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing 
interest from the significant delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages including 
severe emotional distress and humiliation suffered by Plaintiff." (Complaint par's 19 and 27) 
Given the extremely high bar that must be met under a Rule 12(b) motion, i.e. that all of 
the allegations are to be taken as true and construed in most favorable light against the moving 
party - it is nothing short of astonishing that defendants seek the dismissal of Raymond's claims. 
In other words, the defendants are suggesting to the Court that Raymond has no claim even if the 
defendants engaged in the illegal conduct alleged therein and the resulting harms to Raymond. 
They audaciously suggest that Raymond has no recourse for the devastating consequences of the 
defendants' egregious actions in this case. 
Indeed, the Second Restatement of Torts which is oft relied upon by the Idaho Supreme 
Court as authority does contain a "catch all" provision that allows for liability when there has 
been an "intentional act" causing harm that does not necessarily fall within a "traditional 
category of tort liability:" 
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§ 870 Liability for Intended Consequences - General Principle 
One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that 
injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances. 
This liability may be imposed although the actor's conduct does not come within a 
traditional category of tort liability. 
Rest. Torts, 2"'1 § 870. (See Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 
416,423 (1996)(discussed at length supra in Section B.) 
The "comment" after the rule explains its well-founded purpose: 
Nature of Section. This Section is intended to supply a generalization for tortious 
conduct involving harm intentionally inflected. Generalizations have long existed for 
negligence liability, involving conduct producing unreasonable risk of harm to others 
(See §§ 282, 291-294), and for strict liability, involving the carrying on of an activity that 
is abnormally dangerous (See§§ 519-520). As for conduct intentionally causing harm, 
however, it has traditionally been assumed that the several established intentional torts 
developed separately and independently and not in accordance with any unifying 
principle. This Section purports to supply that unifying principle and to explain the basis 
for the development of the more recently created intentional torts. More than that, it is 
intended to serve as a guide for determining when liability should be imposed for harm 
that was intentionally inflicted, even though the conduct does not come within the 
requirements of one of the well established an named intentional torts. 
Id. Comment "a." 
Additionally, the Restatement of Torts further suggests that such a tort could extend as 
well to "intentional harm to a property interest:" 
§ 871. Intentional Harm to a Property Interest. 
One who intentionally deprives another of his legally protected property interest or causes 
injury to the interest is subject to liability to the other if his conduct is generally culpable 
and not justifiable under the circumstances. 
Rest. Torts, 2"d § 871. 
Additionally, Raymond's claims clearly fit within the definitions of"gross negligence" 
and "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" actionable under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
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These terms are defined as: 
1. "Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable person 
in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of 
contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do 
such act and that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful 
consequences to others. 
2. "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person 
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk 
of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such 
harm will result. 
IC§ 6-904C. 
Certainly, Raymond's allegations suggest a "deliberate indifference" and/or an intentional act or 
failure to act creating an "unreasonable risk" to Raymond's interests -yet adding additional basis 
for her claims. 
Of further note, as an element to these claims, Raymond alleges that defendants violated a 
number of criminal statutes with regard to witness tampering and intimidation, destruction of 
evidence, harassment under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and Idaho Code§§ 18-2604 & 2605. These 
allegations, if true, add an additional layer of egregious conduct that warrant a claim of 
wrongdoing. Again, Raymond is not necessarily relying upon the statutes themselves as a 
separate "cause of action," but rather to expand upon the already deeply serious allegations that 
she has made to support a tort claim against the defendants, (and perhaps a claim for punitive 
damages or other non-economic damages.) 
Because Raymond has quite clearly alleged unjustifiable conduct that was intentionally 
injurious or harmful to her as well as her "property" interests (i.e the wrongful death claims) the 
Court need not follow some pre-established ''tort" to fit the allegations in order for Raymond to 
be able to try her claims. Rather, the Court simply can rely upon the "unifying principle" set 
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forth in§ 870 of the Restatement of Torts, and thus allow Raymond to proceed with her claims. 
Again, given the gravity and extensiveness of the allegations, the Court should allow the creation 
or recognition of a tort to allow relief for the wrongs that have been committed, rather than find 
ways to deny such justice. 
B. Defendants are Potentially Liability under a Tortious Interference of a Prospective 
Cause of Action/Economic Advantage. 
Nevertheless, pursuant to the arguments set forth supra, there are established and 
recognized torts in the State ofldaho that could easily fit within many of the allegations set forth 
by Raymond. This is certainly the case under Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 
178, 923 P.2d 416,423 (1996). Payette attempts to pass the holdings in Yoakum off as "dicta" 
that the Court should pay no heed. However, the Supreme Court's guidance in the case clearly 
goes well beyond "dicta" to establishing a recognized tort. In Yoakum, the Supreme Court 
acknowledges § 870 and 871 of the Restatement of Torts as a basis for the possibility of torts 
"not previously recognized in this state, i.e. liability for intended consequences and intentional 
harm to a property interest, based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 870, 871 (1979)." 
Id. 
Although the Yoakum Court did not craft a tort under the Restatement in that particular 
case, it did indicate that: 
however, for guidance in future litigation we take this opportunity to opine on a 
possible cause of action for conduct more eareaious than that presented here. The 
guidelines offered by the authors of the Restatement and the cases which have defined 
the intentional spoliation of evidence cause of action provide a framework for 
another cause of action based upon intentional conduct that unreasonably interferes 
with a party's prospective cause of action. The tort of intentional spoliation of evidence 
has been alternatively identified by courts as the "intentional interference with 
prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence." The court in Smith described this tort 
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as "closely analogous" to the intentional interference with a prospective business 
advantage, a tort which has been recognized in this state. Idaho First National Bank v. 
Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-87, 824 P.2d 841, 859-62 (1991). 
(Id. emphasis added) 
The Court then provides the element for such a cause of action as being similar to a "prospective 
economic advantage" , i.e. that 
Id. 
a plaintiff must establish that the intentional interference by the defendant resulting in 
injury was wrongful. This may be shown by proof that either: (1) the defendant had an 
improper motive to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to 
cause injury to the prospective advantage. 
Again, this direction by the Idaho Supreme Court is not dicta, but rather "opines" on a 
''possible conduct of action" for "future litigation" and additionally - even provides potential 
elements for such a claim. It simply would be an error by this Court to disregard the direction 
provided by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Idaho is certainly not alone in recognizing such a claim. The Supreme Court of Ohio 
recognized a "a cause of action exists in tort for interference with or destruction of evidence" 
with the following elements: 
(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, 
(2) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable, 
(3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiffs case, 
(4) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and 
(5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts; 
such a claim should be recognized between the parties to the primary action and against 
third parties; and such a claim may be brought at the same time as the primary action." 
Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29m 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038, 
1993-Ohio-229, 230 (1993) 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISS - IO 
Page 100
The State of New Jersey also recognizes this type of claim, again, along the lines of 
"interference with prospective economic advantage for the ''willful destruction or concealment of 
evidence." Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. 113, 125-26, 597 A.2d 543, 549-50 (1991). In 
Viviano, which involved the defendants' fraudulent concealment of documents that contained 
"key information" with regard to the liability of the defendants, the court opined as to the sound 
and apparent policy reasons justifying such a claim: 
Immunizing the willful destruction or concealment of evidence would not further the 
policy of encouraging testimonial candor. As the court explained in Petrik v. Monarch 
Printing Corp.,This state's system of civil litigation is founded in large part on a litigant's 
ability under the authority of the Supreme Court rules, to investigate and uncover 
evidence after filing suit. Destruction of evidence known to be relevant to pending 
litigation violates the spirit of liberal discovery. Intentional destruction of evidence 
manifests a shocking disregard for orderly judicial procedures and offends traditional 
notions of fair play. 
Id 251 N.J. Super. at 121, 126, 127,(1991) (citations omitted) 
Again, a substantial (but not complete) part of Raymond's claims include the defendants' 
concealing and tampering of evidence that ultimately affected, or "interfered" with her wrongful 
death claim and caused other damages. Again, this is a recognized claim in the State of Idaho, 
and should be allowed in this case. 
C. ISP's Conduct is Not "Negligent Investigation" but Rather Gross Negligence or 
Reckless, Willful and Wanton Conduct Actionable under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act. 
All of the arguments set forth in Sections A-B herein apply to the ISP's recent "joinder" 
to Payette's motion. However, ISP makes a separate argument that is wholly without merit, i.e. 
that Raymond's claims are merely a "disguised" caused of action for "negligent investigation" 
which is not a recognized tort in Idaho. 
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ISP's memorandum cites two Idaho Court of Appeals decisions in support of this notion, 
Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923 (Ct. App. 1992) and Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618 (Ct App. 2002). 
However the facts and holdings in these respective decisions bear no resemblance to the deeply 
serious claims being made by Raymond against the Idaho State Police. In Wimer the Idaho Court 
of Appeals rejected a claim by the plaintiffs that the Idaho Fish and Game had "negligently" 
investigated game hunting violations after the plaintiffs had been acquitted of such charges. 
Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho at 923-24, 841 P.2d at 453-54. The Wimer Court held that the 
plaintiffs' claims could not succeed because "a private person or entity" would "not be liable" for 
the "negligent investigation of a crime" and therefore not a proper tort claim. Id. 
In this case, Raymond is not claiming that ISP ''negligently investigated a crime," but 
rather, among other disturbing allegations, is claiming that the ISP "engaged in an enterprise or 
conspiracy with Sloan to, and did in fact willfully and with full knowledge of Sloan's unlawful 
conduct, conceal evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and 
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or potential 
witnesses, all in violation of state and federal law but in favor of a corrupt policy and effort to 
protect fellow Idaho law enforcement officers from the consequences of their unlawful conduct." 
(Complaint ,r 18). These are claims that most certainly would be actionable if conducted by a 
private person or entity, and thus an appropriate tort claim against ISP. Additionally, such claims 
clearly fit within the definitions of "gross negligence" and "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" 
actionable under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. IC § 6-904C. Simply put, the "gravamen" of 
Raymond's case is not "negligent investigation," but rather intentional misconduct and a 
violation of a number of laws, which are actionable as a tort. 
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D. Raymond's Damages are not Speculative but are Provable and Presumed because of 
the Defendants' Wrongful Conduct. 
Again, without addressing any of the damages specifically alleged by Raymond, 
defendant Payette suggests that Raymond's damages are "speculative" because in effect they 
were not "anticipated." In considering basic principles of tort law and the types of damages 
allowed, again, Payette is misguided. Indeed: 
The general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all detriment 
caused whether it could have been anticipated or not ... one who commits a wrongful act 
is liable for all the direct injury resulting from such act, although such resulting injury 
could not have been contemplated as a probable result of the act done. 
Id. (citations omitted) See, also Restat 2d of Torts, § 910 (One injured by the tort of another is 
entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally 
caused by the tort.) 
Idaho's jury instruction manual identifies various types of "proximate" damages that 
could be applicable in this case, including "economic" damages such as past and future earnings 
lost as a result of the injury, or opportunity costs, as well as non-economic damages such as the 
suffering of physical and mental pain. IDJI2d § 9.01. See also, Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 314 (Idaho 201 0)(holding that the jury properly awarded damages 
for damage to family finances and substantial emotional and mental stress.) 
The long established standard with regard to the proving of damages, is that: 
Damages need be proved only with a "reasonable certainty," and this means that the 
existence of damages must be taken out of the realm of speculation. The mere fact that it 
is difficult to arrive at an exact amount of damages, where it is shown that damages 
resulted, does not mean that damages may not be awarded; it is for the trier-of-fact to fix 
the amount. 
Trilogy Network Sys. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Idaho 2007)(citations 
omitted) 
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Moreover, courts have emphasized that an inability to prove exact damages should not absolve 
wrongful acts: 
The law requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and 
the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. This is 
especially true where ... it is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have created the 
difficulty in proving the amount of loss of profits. The fact that the amount of damage 
may not be susceptible of exact proof or may be uncertain, contingent or difficult of 
ascertainment does not bar recovery. 
Marsu, B. V. v. Walt Disney Co., 185 F.3d 932, 938-939 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999) (citations omitted) 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has noted that particularly in cases where there has been 
"breach of a duty of law" resulting in "unliquidated damages" that the "best evidence" to prove 
such damages is "often nothing better than the opinions of persons well informed upon the 
subject under investigation." Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 74 Idaho 416, 423-424, 263 
P.2d 705, 709 (Idaho 1953). 
Finally, as it relates to a spoliation claim, the Viviano acknowledges this well founded 
principle, i,e, that "mere uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not preclude a recovery 
even though proof of the amount of damages is inexact." Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. at 
129. The court upheld the decision of the jury to award lost interest, expenses and punitive 
damages for the delayed judgment resulting from the spoliation claim, finding that: "On the 
basis of the testimony presented to it, the jury in this case could reasonably have concluded that 
(the concealed evidence) been provided to plaintiff in 1982 or 1983, (the plaintiff) would then 
have obtained a settlement amount at least as large as that which she received in 1987." Viviano 
v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. at 120, 129. 
Given these basic tort principles, including the presumption of damages when there has 
been an intentional tort, Raymond's alleged damages are not speculative. Raymond alleges that 
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such damages include "a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing interest from the 
significant delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages including severe emotional 
distress and humiliation." (Complaint par. 27.) She further alleges that: "the absence of (a 
conviction against Sloan) exponentially increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintiff's civil 
case, and because of the defendants' evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove 
liability, making Plaintiff's civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have 
been." (Complaint par. 19.) 
To truly understand the harm caused by the defendants tortious interference claims, the 
jury will only need to step into the shoes of Raymond and what she has witnessed and 
experienced from her perspective as a result of defendants' wrongful conduct. From the very 
outset, the initial ISP investigators reported that Sloan had operated his vehicle unsafely, 
traveling at an high rate of speed which resulted in her father's death. They further found that 
alcohol was not a factor. Sloan was then charged with felony manslaughter. This was an open 
and shut case on liability for Raymond's wrongful death claim. 
Instead, the ISP and Payette conspired to conceal and tamper with evidence, intimidate 
and wrongfully influence testimony, and take other measures to improperly thwart these basic 
and undisputable findings ofliability. They in effect improperly muddied the waters for 
Ramond's wrongful death claim, delaying its resolution for many years, as well as massively 
increasing the costs of pursuing such claims. A jury could also find that defendants' conduct 
affected the value of her claim as well. Again, there is no requirement of "certainty" in 
determining damages, particularly when there has been wrongful conduct, particularly when such 
conduct created the difficulty of calculating such damages. 
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The jury can also consider the emotional and mental toll the defendants' conduct has 
taken on Raymond. Not only has the delay in resolving the case been emotionally and mentally 
taxing upon Raymond, but she has also experienced anguish and distrust caused when rather than 
promote and seek justice for wrongful and even criminal acts, law enforcement instead protected 
its own from experiencing the consequences of such acts, possibly breaking the law as well in the 
process. In further aggravation to Raymond, the defendants impugned the good name and 
reputation of Raymond's father. Simply put, because of defendants' conduct, Raymond has lost 
most all faith and trust in law enforcement, and that has resulted in massive anxiety, stress and 
fear. These are all very real and consequential damages that are well beyond the realm of 
speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, defendants' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss should be denied. 
DATED this 21 st day ofNovember, 2016. 
&OLSEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 21st day of November, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Michael J. Elia, Esq. 
Brady J. Hall, Esq. 
MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
P.O. Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83707 
FAX: (208) 336-7031 
EMAIL: mje@melawfim1.net 
Method of Service: 
( )mail ()hand~~ 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Idaho State Police 
brady@melawfirm.net ~ 
Michael J. Kane, Esq. ( ) mail ( ) hand ( flax ( mail 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC /-
4355 W. Emerald St., Ste. 190 Attorneys for Defendants, Payette County 
P.O. Box 2865 and Scott Sloan 
Boise, Idaho 83701 




Honorable Christopher S. Nye 
Canyon County Court 
EMAIL: secsm@canyonco.org (Courtesy Chambers Cop 
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BETTYJ.D~N,CLEFI< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIIICI' Qi' r l'llll'UTY 
THE STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, 




IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State apcy, 
PA YE1TE COUNTY, 11. political subdivision of 
the State of Idaho, and SCOIT SLOAN 
Ddendants. 
Case No,CV~201S-9S4 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ONPLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND 
DEFENDANTS' I.R.CP.12(bX6) 
MO'DON 10 DISMa COUNTS II 
ANDm 
Pwntiffs motion t.o· ~- and Pa~-Co~tf' s ~JtC.P. ll(t,)(6) ~on cmm on for 
hearing on November .28, 2016. ~ ~~ Poli(:e .. C'I$nj~iiµ,d.in fayette County's motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This lawsuit .ltemS from a traffic accident that occurred in Payette County on October 13, 
.' .... :, .•· .. ·.· 
2011. l:>eputy Scott Sloan ("Sloan") was on duty and~ his ~-veJucle on-.Highway 30 
when he hit Bany Johnson. Mr. Johnson died as a ~t of~ cr&AA.. . 
•; ... ; ',· . . 
ISP inv~gatcd the crash. SlQan was charied -with vchicular manslaughter in Pa,ette 
C.oonty case CR-2012-S66. The spec.ial prosecutor dismissed the case on March 8, 201-3. 
Raymond filed her compJaint on February 27. 2015. In the complaint, she aDcaes three 
causes of action: Count 1-Wrongful ·Deadl·{Payctte County): Count Il-Tonious Interference 
with Prospective Action (all Defendants); and, Count ID-Tortious Jn~oc with ~spectiye 
. . . . . .• . 
Economic Advantaae (all Defen~ts; in the altcmative to ~Wlt Il). . . . 
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IL STANDARD 
The decision to grant leave to amend is discretionary and shall be freely gi\1en when 
justice so requires. I.R.C.P. 15. Leave to amend is properly denied when the amendment would 
be futile or fails to state a valid claim. PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388 (2016). The 
burden to show why a court should not grant leave to 8.mffld is on the parties opposed to the 
amendment. Clark v. Olien. 110 Idaho 323, 326 (1986). 
A request to dismiss a claim pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) will be aranted if the pleading 
fails to stat.c a claim up0n which review can be Bl'8Iltcd, The standard is whether the non-moving 
party "bas alleged sufficient facts in support of bis claim, which if true, would entitle him to 
rclicf." Orrock v. APJMlton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 (:2.000). Factual allegations will be considered 
true, uoless they arc pumy conclusory. Id. "After viewing all facts and inferences from tbe 
record in favor of the non-moving p~y1 ,the Co_urt,, \_Vill .~.k whether ~ .. claim for Jelief bas ~ , ... . . . ·, .. 
stated. The issue is_ not whether the plaintiff will ulthnately prevail, but_ wldiei-the party ·is 
entitled to offer evidence to SllppO[t the clahna." Coal. for Agrlc. 11 F~e v, Canyon Cty., -160 
Idaho 142, 145 (2016). 
"[E]very reasoD!lhle i~~ _will. be .made to sustain a complaint against a Rule .. ' . ' . . -. .- - ' ...... ~ . 
12(b)(6) motion to disllliss." Ha~r v. Harptr, l~ .ldahos,s_, 536 (Q. App: 1~). "A motion 
to dismiss uncb" LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) will not be granted ... unl~ the O®--ntoving party woul.41 be . ·' . . . . . . . ' .· 
~le to prove any conceivable set of facts in su~ of its. claim." Yoakum v. H_artfo~ Fi~ 
Ins. Co., 129 Idabo 171, 175 (1996); Orthrru:tn v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962 (1995); . . . .. . 
Wackerli v. Marti1uJ'!.k, 82 ldah<> 400 (l~).,~'14\] dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likel;Y to be 
granted only in the unu&ual case in which the plaintµ! includes allcgati~ sbowi11g on ~ f~ 
of tile complaint that there is some insU1JI10untabl~ bar to_reli~." Harper, 122 Idaho at S36., 
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DI. DISCUSSION 
A Motion to Amend 
To recover in tort, Plaintiff must file a timely tort claim notice detailing the conduct and 
circumstances giving rise to the claim. J.C.§§ 6-907-910. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff 
complied with the ITCA notice requirements with respect to Counts n. Ill, and the breach of 
privacy and dignity claim. Whether Plaintiff complied with the notice requirements is a question 
of fact. Cox v. Ciry of Sa,,dpotn1, 140 Idaho 127 (Ct. App. 2003). Courts take .. a liberal approach 
to interpreting the notice requirement of the ITCA.,, CNW. lLC v. New Swtden Irrigation Dist,, 
161 Idaho 89 (2016); I.C. § 6-907. Thus, the Coort will not deny the motion to amend based on 
failure to tile a tort claim notice. The claim will fail if the jmy finds That Plaintiff did not satisfy 
the lTCA notice req~mcnts. 
Plaintiff wants tQ add a claim for breach of privacy and dignity against Payette County 
and Does 1-X for conduct of.disparcbers and officers.in relaying infynnation _about the ~k ~ 
Mr. Johnson's death. Plaintiff alleges that the -dispatchen ~ 9fficers were _unprofcssj~nal. 
failed to notify Plaintiff ~out the ~ before .tl\)tifying the public:, made inappropriate . '• .. : : . . . 
comments about Mr. Johnson and his family members. ~ did not treat Plaintiff with respect. 
Plaintiff alleges that lhe conduct caused her to suffer severe emotio~ and mental anpsb an~ 
humiliation, to lose faith in law enforcement, and to fear for hei: well-being. . . . . . 
Breach of privacy and diguity is ~ aQ. ~ta~liibe!l ton ~ Idaho. Conduct is no_t 
actionable me~y because it is idoonaideralc and unki~. John~~n v._ McPhee, 147 Idaho 455 
(Ct.App.2009); Bro~ v. Fritz, 108 ldabo 357 (1985). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached 
a. duty owed to deeedent's family members and next of kin to properly handle highly sensitive 
information in times of ttagedy. ~lajntiff does ... ~~ point to ~ statute or rule that C11:pressly state~ 
. . . . . . . ·. . . . .. 
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that 911 dispatchers and/or law enforcement officers owe such a dllty, and it docs not appear that 
there is one. 1 Thus, Plaintiff is asking the Court to find that a new duty exists. 
''Generally, the questiOD whether a doty exists is a question of law." Udy v. Custer Cty., 
136 Idaho 386, 389 {2001). H[l]t is possible to aeate a duty where one previously did not exist." 
Id. Detennining whether a duty will arise in a particular context •1nvolves a consideration of 
policy and the weighing of several factors(,]" including: 
[T]he foreseeability of hann to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injwy, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached t.o the def cndant's 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm. the extent of the bmden to the 
defendant and c011Scquences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care 
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost. and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved. · 
R.ife v. Lortg, 127:ldabo 841, 846_(1~5);,Trupell_ ~- Granieri, 133 ldall().244, 247-48 (1999). In 
weighing these considerations, the burden on· dispar.cbers and· law cnfmccmcnt would be . ' . . 
enormous, The Court will not find that such a duty arises in this contf!~t. ';[',here can be no liability 
on this particular theory, Suwners v. Camb~g~ Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 .Jdaho 95~. 955 
(2004) ("'Only when a defendant owes a du~y lo. ~.Piaintiff.~ tort l~~ility exist."). . . . . . . 
Wbili, Plaintiff's breach of privacy and dignity theory is not a viable claim. she alleged 
facts which may support a claim for 'intrusion upon seclusion. See ~1de1'8on v. BOMer, 142 Idaho 
733, 739 (Ct App. 2006); Ur@ga v. Federaud Publicatkms,. I11e'.~ 138. Idaho SSO, .553 (2003): 
Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311. ( 1998). Pl~tiff may ·amend ihe co~laint to .include a claim 
•• • • • • • • • , 4 • ~. 
for inrrusion upon seclusion. Se~ I.R.C.P. 8; Navo v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp .• 373 P.3d 681, 693 
(Idaho 2016) ("Under notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating wticular 
1 Even if first notifying nexl of kin is a common practice, ii ~oes not iraiisbie into a legal duty to do so in the future. 
Sa, Udy 11. C,,_r Cry .. _136 ldaho 386, 389-90 (200_1). _ . ,. .. . 
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Cbeoties in its pleadings. Rathel. a party is required to state an underlying cause of action and the 
facts from which that cause of action arises."). 
B. LR.C.P, 12lh}C6l motion 
The Defendants seek dismissal of Counts I_I and m. The gist of these claims is that the 
Defendants conspired to cover-up, conceal, and falsify evidence, and/or wlawfully influenced or 
interfered with the investigation S\Ul'OWJding Sloan, resulting in dismissal of Sloan,s criminal 
case. Plaintiff alleges that, but for the Defendants' cover~up and intcderence, Sloan would have 
been convicted and such conviction would have rendered liability res judicata. The absence of 
the cocviclion exponentially increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintitrs civil case. As a 
result, the Defendants reduced the value of Plaintiff's wrongful cbth claim. 
1. Count 11-Toriious i,11iifirenct 
0
wt11i'Proij,,ctivi Acikm 
There is no private cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, 1.C. H 18-2604, 
and -2605. The basis for this claim comes from Yoakum v. Hariford Fire Ins. Co., 129 ldabo 171 
(1996), in which the ldaho S_upremc Court "opine[d] 011 a possible _cause of action" known _as 
spoliation of evidence. 
In Yoakum, the Court noted tbat spoliation is its own _intentional tort. The Court 
said that "[t]hc guidelines offered by the authon of thelttstatcmcnt and the cases 
which have dc1iDcd lhc .intentional spoliation of evidcm:c cause of action pro-ride 
a framework for another canse of ·action based· upon intentional conduct mat 
unreasonably intederea with a party's prospectjve caµse of action. The tort of 
intentional spoliation of evidence bas been alternatively identified by couns as the 
'intentional in~ with prospt.cti~e civil !ICtion by ~poliation of evidence.• " 
[Yoal:wn, 129 ldalio] at 178 (citing Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 
(Alaska 198_6)). _The Court also stated that it i~ closely,~~ with the tort of 
· intentional intcrference with a prospective business advantage. ldt.iho First Not'l 
Bank v. Blis.t Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-87 (1991). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
TO AMEND AND LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS-S 
DEC-30-201615:57 From:2086426011 ID:N+T PMH+O Page:005 R:95% 
Page 112
' '. ; 
ueC.jU, LUIO 'l:u~rM rayette ~ounty ~lerks Utt1ce No. LI'?'? P. o/9 
Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip. Co., 137 Idaho 578, 582 (2002). Idaho courts have not adopted it as 
an independent cause of action. Id.; Cook v. State Dept. of Tnl11S., 133 Idaho 288 (1999). 
Plaintiff asks this Court to adopt it as an independent cause of action. 
The decision to fashion and create a new intentional tort is discretionary. Yoakum, 129 
Idaho at 177-178. (RcstatemMt (Second) of TOl.'tS provides "mere guidelines for a court to use in 
fashioning the contours of new intentional torts a court may wish to create."). Although Yoakum 
recognized in dicta that spoliation is an mdependent tort, the spoliation doctrine has not been 
adopted as an .independent cause of action. Rather, it has been applied as a rule of evidence and 
pcnnits an inference and a jury instruction on spoliation. Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 
Idaho 821 (2003); Rtcuas, ,upra; Cook, supra; Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 8f1l (1999);,Sn.an 
V: St~, 127 ldah9 806 (1995). The Court ~~C$ to adopt it as !ID. independent ~use of action. 
2. Count Hl-Tonioua Interference with Prospective Economic Advantagt 
Tottious interference with a prospective economic advantage is recognized in Idaho. In 
order to establish the claim, Plaintiff must show: 
( 1) the existence of a valid ecoQO.~c ex~~y.. (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the blterferer, (3) wtentional' inter.femnce inducing 
termination of the cx~cy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measwe 
beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (S) resulting damage to the plaintiff 
whose expectaDCy bas been disrupted. 
Syringa Networkl, UC v. ldaho l>ep't of Admin., ISS Idaho 5S, 64 (2013). Plaintiff alleges that 
she "had a valid ccooomic expectancy known to the defendants in the form of Plaintiff's claims 
.... , .... . . .. ,. . . . 
and causes of action against Sloan aod Payette County arising from the death of Mr. Johnson" 
and that the Defendants "int.entionally interfered with Plaintiffs valid economic expectancy, 
resulting in the reduction. destruction, or disruption thereof." (Complaint, TI 36,.37). 
This tort addresses interference with 811 "economic relationship" between a plaintiff and 
another party. Highlan.d Ente~rl.res, lnc.·;.··•~~r;· 133 ldaho 330,339 n. 3 (1999). The ·purpose 
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of this toa is to protect the incegrity of, and expectancies in, voluntarily created economic 
relationships, both commercial and noncommercial, that would have very likely resulted in a 
pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff but for the defendant's interference. See rd.; Fox v. Country Mut. 
Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 677 (Or, 2000); Cron v. Zimmer, 296 P.3d 567 (Or. 2013). A civil lawsuit docs 
not repICSent the kind of noncomm~ial relationship and prospective economic advantage 
protected by the tort of inlc.ntional interference with an economic advantage. Id. Plaintiff does 
oot have a valid economic expectancy in this lawsuit. 
Addidonally, Counts II and m are premised on a fact that Plaintiff c:annot prove; That but 
for the Defendants' alleged misconduct, Sloan would have hr.en convicted of man.slaughter. If 
these counts proceed to trial, the jury would be asked to ·consider the merits of Sloan's criminal 
case and decide whether, by a preponderance of evidence, Sloan would have been convb;ted 
beyond a reuonable doubt. There. are. ~Y.: poa&~bl~ ,.ou~mcs in a criminal case, and 
speculating about one possible ou~come in Sloan's criminal.case is not a basis for relief in-this 
civil case. Plaintiff cannot prove this conclusory fact and it is an i.nmrm,ountable bar to relief. 
Finally, even if these are viable claims, they are premature.~ the outcome in this case 
needs to be known before Plaintiff can s~~ 1~t. the_ val~e of her wrongful death claims was 
re.duce4. City of McCaU 11. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2008) (A tort claim cannot accrue until an 
· injury is sustained Ol' act\lal damage occurs). 
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THEREFORE, IT JS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiff's motion to amend is GRANTED, In part, and DENIED, in part; 
2. Defendants" I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts n and mis GRANTED. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this t/1_ day of J)~C. · , 2016, a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing document was addressed and delivered as indicated 
below: 
Nathan Olsen 
Petenen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 ''E'' Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Michael Kane 
Michael Kane & Associates, PU.C 
4355 W. Emerald St.. Ste. 190 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Michael J. Elia 
Moore & Elia, LLP 
P.O. Box 6756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
[ I U.S. Mail, pmtage prepaid 
[
[ !, Hand~ercd 
/] Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ) Hand-delivered 
I .,Y' Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ J . liend-dc __ livcred 
[ '/. ,1'1 · Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS~J. &eN, CLERK 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYE'ITE u OEMY 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, 




IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political' 
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT 
SLOAN, 
Defendants. 
Cue No. CV-2015-00954-C 
PARTIAL JUDGMENT Of 
DISMISSAL OF IDAHO STATE 
POLICE 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: · 
That Plaintiffs• claims against Defendant Idaho s._ Police ~e dismissed with prejudice, 
that Plaintiffs take nothing from said Defendant, and that this action is dismissed as to Idaho 
State Police only. 
DA TED this ~y of..!o=oo=::::::J!lll¥.l14A11UM,t 
Christopher S. Nye 
District Judge 
PARTIAL .ro»GMENT or DISMISSAL OF 11:l~HO STATE POLICE - p. 1 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of /4,1, , 2017, I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane Associates 
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701-2865 
Attorneys for Defendants Payette County and 
Scott Sloan 
Michael J. Elia 
Brady J. Hall 
MOORE, ELIA, KRAFT & HALL, LLP 
Post Office Box 6756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Attorneys for Defendant Idaho State Police 
___ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile Transmission 208-524-3391 
~ E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile TrallSJDission 208-342-2323 
2: E-Mail: m1qrqe@k1YJw.net 
_ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile Transmission 208-336-703 l 
ZE-~~ mje@melarinn.net 
PARTIAL JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL OF IDAHO STATE POLICE w p. 2 
I 
 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE– P. 1 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190 
Post Office Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865 
Telephone:  (208) 342-4545 
Facsimile:   (208) 342-2323 
Email:  mkane@ktlaw.net  
Idaho State Bar No. 2652 
 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF  
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
   
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,  
and as Personal Representative of the Estate of 
BARRY JOHNSON, 
 




IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, SCOTT 
SLOAN, and JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,   
 




















Case No. CV-2015-00954-C 
 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS  
WITH PREJUDICE  
 
 
 COMES NOW the Plaintiff, JACKIE RAYMOND, by and through her attorney of 
record, Nathan Olsen, of the firm Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen, and the Defendant, PAYETTE 
COUNTY, by and through its attorneys of record Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & 
Associates, PLLC, and do hereby stipulate and agree to the dismissal of this lawsuit with 
Electronically Filed
7/5/2018 1:45 PM
Third Judicial District, Payette County
Betty Dressen, Clerk of the Court
By: Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk
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prejudice. Each side shall bear their own fees and costs associated with the dismissal of this 
lawsuit. 
DATED this ),fr day of _<:Ii . ',Jj~f:.-_, 2018. 
, , rALL & OLSEN 
Nathan Olsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this ___ day of _____ 2018. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BY: _______________ _ 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE- P. 2 
 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE– P. 2 
prejudice.  Each side shall bear their own fees and costs associated with the dismissal of this 
lawsuit. 
 DATED this ________ day of ____________, 2018. 
      PETERSEN, MOSS, HALL & OLSEN  
 
         BY: ________________________________________ 
      Nathan Olsen  
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
 
 DATED this 5th day of July, 2018. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
         BY:      /s/ Michael J. Kane                                          . 






STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE– P. 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff: 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 “E” Street 
Idaho Falls, ID  83401 
 [Email:  nolsen@pmholaw.com] 
_______ Email 
__XX__ iCourt eFile/eServe 
Counsel for ISP: 
Mr. Michael J. Elia 
Moore & Elia, LLP 
P. O. Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83707 
[Facsimile:  #(208) 336-7031] 
[Email:  mje@melawfirm.net] 
__XX__ Email 
_______ iCourt eFile/eServe 
     /s/ Michael J. Kane . 
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MICHAEL J. KANE (JSB No. 2652) 
BARBARA BEEHNER-KANE (ISB No. 2853) 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190 
Post Office Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865 
Telephone: (208) 342-4545 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323 
Email: mkane@ktlaw.net and bbeehner(@,ktlaw.net 
FILED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO 
JUL 1 0 2018 
8~ESSEN,CLEAK 
BY--n t ~/,-..V-.- ---DEPUTY 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, ) 
and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ) 
BARRY JOHNSON, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
IDAHO STA TE POLICE, an Idaho State 
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, SCOTT 














JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-2015-00954-C 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
All claims against all parties are hereby dismissed with prejudice. No attorney fees or costs 
are awarded. 
FINAL JUDGMENT - P. 1 
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JUDGE CHRISTOPHER NYE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 7 DJ , 2018, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by th~ method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff: 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com] 
Counsel for Defendant Payette County: 
Mr. Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190 
Boise, ID 83706 
[Email: mkane@ktlaw.net] 
Counsel for ISP: 
Mr. Michael J. Elia 
Moore & Elia, LLP 
P. 0. Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83 707 
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031] 
[Email: mje(a),melawfirm.net] 











Facsimile --lz--- Email 
iCourt eFile/eServe ---
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an
heir, and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of BARRY JOHNSON, 
                           Plaintiff,
v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, SCOTT
SLOAN, and JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,





TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, IDAHO STATE POLICE; THE PARTY’S
ATTORNEY, Michael J. Elia, P.O. Box 6756, Boise, Idaho 83707; and THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE- ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Jackie Raymond, individually as an heir, and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Barry Johnson, appeals against the above named 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
Electronically Filed
8/17/2018 11:18 AM
Third Judicial District, Payette County
Betty Dressen, Clerk of the Court
By: Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk
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Defendant, Idaho State Police, an Idaho State agency, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final
Judgment entered in the above entitled action on July 10, 2018, Honorable Christopher S. Nye,
presiding.
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment
described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), I.A.R.
3. The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the appellant intends to
assert in the appeal are as follows:
A. Did the district court err in dismissing the plaintiff’s tortious interference 
 claims against the defendant Idaho State Police under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record?  No
5. Is a reporter’s transcript requested?  No
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record as it pertains to the appeal and defendant Idaho State Police:
A. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed February 27, 2015, (initially
in Ada County, subsequently transferred to Payette County).
B. Defendant Idaho State Police’s (ISP) Answer to Complaint, filed
February 4, 2016.
C. Defendant ISP’s Joinder in Payette County’s Motion for Partial Dismissal
Pursuant to IRCP § 12(b)(6), filed November 14, 2016.
D. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Rule 12 Motion for Partial
Dismissal, filed November 25, 2016.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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E. Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Amend and IRCP
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, filed December 30, 2016.
F. Final Judgment entered July 10, 2018.
G. Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal filed August 17, 2018.
7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: NOT APPLICABLE
8. I certify:
A. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
No additional transcripts have been ordered.
B. That if transcripts have been requested, the clerk of the district court has
been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter’s transcript.
C. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk’s record has been paid.
D. That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
E. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2018.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
Attorneys for Appellant
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
       I hereby certify that on this 17th day of August, 2018, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Persons Served: Method of Service:
Attorneys for Defendant, Idaho State Police 
Michael J. Elia, Esq. (U) mail
MOORE, ELIA, KRAFT & HALL, LLP (   ) fax 
P.O. Box 6756 (   ) email 
Boise, Idaho 83707 (U) iCourt eFile/eServe
FAX: (208) 336-7031
EMAIL: mje@melawfirm.net
Attorneys for Defendants, Payette County 
and Scott Sloan
Michael J. Kane, Esq. (   ) mail
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC (   ) fax 
4355 W. Emerald St., Ste. 190 (   ) email 




Courtesy Chambers Copy To:
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye




               acahill@canyonco.org 
/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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Certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28) Page 1 of 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
Supreme Court No. 46272-2018 Jacqueline Marie Raymond 
 vs.
 Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3, 
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
I, Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Payette, do hereby certify that the following 







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court on this the 20th day of September, 2018.
BETTY DRESSEN
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By:           
Deputy Clerk
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Clerk’s Certificate of Appeal - D (MISC26) Page 1 of 2
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
Supreme Court No.       Jacqueline Marie Raymond 
 vs.
 Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3, 
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
 
Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable Christopher S. Nye presiding.
Case number from court: CV-2015-954
Order or judgment appealed from: Final Judgment filed July 10, 2018
Attorney for Appellant: Nathan Olsen
Attorney for Respondent: Michael Elia and Michael Kane
Appealed by: Plaintiff
Appealed against: Defendants
Notice of Appeal filed: August 17, 2018
Amended Notice of Appeal filed: n/a
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: n/a
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: n/a
Appellate fee paid: yes on August 17, 2018   None:       
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's Request for additional record filed: n/a
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's Request for additional transcript filed: n/a
Transcript filed: no
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? no
If requested, name of each reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below 
at the address below: n/a
BETTY DRESSEN
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 08/20/2018 By:  Julie Anderson          
Deputy Clerk
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Clerk’s Certificate of Appeal - D (MISC26) Page 2 of 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Michael John Kane mkane@ktlaw.net [X] By E-mail
Michael Joseph Elia mje@melawfirm.net [X] By E-mail
Nathan Miles Olsen nolsen@pmholaw.com [X] By E-mail
Idaho Supreme Court                                                                  [X]By Odyssey Task Manager
Dated: 08/20/2018
Betty Dressen




Certificate of Service - D (MISC29) Page 1 of 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
Supreme Court No. 46272-2018 Jacqueline Marie Raymond 
 vs.
 Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3, 
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Payette, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any 
Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:
Michael Joseph Elia
PO Box 6756
Boise ID  83707
[X] By email                                                       
Nathan Miles Olsen
485 E Street
Idaho Falls ID  83402
[X] By email     
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court on this the 1st day of October, 2018.
BETTY DRESSEN




2nd day of November, 2018
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